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SOCIAL NORMS AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MARRIAGE

Elizabeth S. Scott*

Americans have interesting and somewhat puzzling attitudes about the state’s role in
defining and enforcing family obligations. Most people view lasting marriage as an important part
of their life plans and take the commitment of marriage very seriously. Yet any legal initiative
designed to reinforce that commitment generates controversy and is viewed with suspicion in
many quarters. For example, covenant marriage statutes, which offer couples entering marriage
the option of undertaking a modest marital commitment, are seen by many observers as coercive
and regressive measures rather than ameliorating reforms.1
In general, the law has tended to reflect (and perhaps has contributed to) this wariness
about legal commitment in marriage. No-fault divorce law signals that marriage is a transitory
commitment, one that is easily set aside. Moreover, there is continuing reluctance to permit
spouses to use private agreements to reinforce their marital commitment. Few courts, for
example, would enforce a premarital agreement incorporating covenant marriage terms.2
In the business context, in contrast, legal enforcement of reciprocal promises is routine
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University Professor and Robert C. Taylor Research Professor, University of Virginia.
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2La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§9:234, 9:245(A)(1), 9:224(C), 9:225(A)(3), 9:272-275, 9:307-309 (West Supp. 1999);
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § §25-901-906 (West 1999). The Louisiana law allows couples contemplating marriage to
choose between marriage regulated under conventional divorce law and covenant marriage, which allows divorce on
fault grounds or after two years separation. Since the existing statute included some fault grounds, the primary
differences are the required premarital counseling and the default 2 year separation ground for divorce. Some
commentators have been quite critical of covenant marriage statutes, seeing them as state coercion and as a serious
threat to women. See Katha Pollitt, O’Niell
2
Theodore F. Haas, The Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions on Divorce, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 879,
909-10 (1988); Eric Rasmussen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage
Contract, 73 Ind. L.J. 453, 462-63 (1998).
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and uncontroversial. The availability of legal enforcement expands the freedom of contracting
parties by offering them the option of a binding commitment. Contract promotes cooperation by
reinforcing informal social norms of reciprocity and discouraging opportunistic behavior. Thus, it
protects (and encourages) investment in the relationship to the mutual benefit of the contracting
parties.2 But even though the metaphor of marriage as a contract is well established, many people
shy away from applying these lessons to marriage.3 At the same time, a divorce rate of 50%
suggests that informal norms are often not successful in sustaining cooperation in marriage. As
Russell Hardin put it, “If contracts become as shaky as marriage, then our society will be in
danger of collapse.”4 Contracts are not as unstable as marriage, in part because the parties
understand that the commitment will be legally enforced. Why then is legal commitment
associated with choice in contract and with coercion in marriage?
A simple explanation of the puzzle is that regulation of family relationships is the domain
of social norms and not of formal legal enforcement. Thus, the law does not (and perhaps should
not) regulate behavior in intimate relationships. This response has some truth, but ultimately it is
unsatisfactory. Legal regulation of family obligations is both accepted and effective in some
contexts. For example, although parental responsibilities in intact families are generally regulated
by informal social norms, the law prescribes parental duties and intervenes readily when parents
deviate from accepted norms.5 Further, legal reforms designed to reinforce desirable social norms
of parental obligation, such as the recent child support enforcement legislation, have been

2

Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between
Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 261, 267 (1985); Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in
Long-Term Contracts, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 2005, 2030-34, 2040-42 (1987).

3

Sir Henry Maine; Elizabeth S. Scott and Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1225
(1998).
4

Russell Hardin, Trustworthiness, 107 Ethics 26, 35 (1996).

5
The law preempts parental authority in some areas, requiring compulsory school attendance and restricting child
labor. When parents deviate from minimum standards of care, state agents intervene under child abuse laws. See t.a.n._
to _ infra.
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effective and relatively uncontroversial.6

So it would seem that sometimes the law functions

usefully as a “norm manager,”7 reinforcing norms of family obligation, and sometimes that role
meets resistance and is ineffective (as many people predict will be the fate of the covenant
marriage laws).
Marriage is thus a particularly fertile environment in which to explore the influence of law
on norms, a subject attracting much interest in the legal literature. Legal scholars have tended to
analyze the state’s role in shaping norms in terms of isolated rules directed at discrete social
problems such as littering or smoking in public places. In the domain of marriage, however, law
and social norms have been intricately interwoven to form a complex scheme of social regulation.
Traditional law reinforced and prescribed both gender norms and commitment norms in marriage.
Gender norms prescribed hierarchical and differential roles for husbands and wives, while
commitment norms defined marriage as a cooperative relationship of lifelong obligation. The law
also privileged marriage and stigmatized other intimate relationships. This duality reinforced the
elevated social status of marriage. At the same time, the legal responsibilities of marriage, the
barriers to exit, and the substantive fault grounds for divorce made marriage a serious business.
Thus, the willingness to make the legal commitment was a powerful signal of good intentions to
the other party and to the community.8 Although the relative impact of law and norms in shaping
expectations about marital behavior can’t be quantified, it is uncontroversial that the institution of
normative marriage is defined in important ways by its legal framework.9
This legal framework has undergone major adjustments in recent years. First, the law has
embraced egalitarian gender norms, categorically withdrawing support from hierarchal,
6

Beginning in the mid-1980's, a complex network of federal and state legislation has contributed to more effective
child support enforcement. See t.a.n. _ to _ infra.
7

Cass Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 907 (1996).

8

Several scholars have applied signaling theory to the analysis of marriage. William Bishop, “Is He Married?”:
Marriage As Information, 34 U. Toronto L.J. 245 (1984); Eric Posner, Family Law and Social Norms, in The Fall and
Rise of Freedom of Contract 256 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999); Michael J. Trebilcock, Marriage As A Signal, in The Fall
and Rise of Freedom of Contract 245.
9

Steven Nock, Marriage in Men’s Lives (1998). Nock describes domestic relations law as an embodiment of
collective ideals about marriage. He uses law as one basis for defining the institution of normative marriage.
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differentiated marital roles. Beyond this, a substantial portion of the legal framework of marriage
has been dismantled through reforms that can fairly be described as de-regulation of marital
norms. Deregulation deserves more attention than it has received from norms scholars, because it
illuminates the ways that legal reforms affecting social norms can have unanticipated (and
sometimes undesirable) consequences. Thus, for example, no-fault divorce law, conceived as a
modest modernizing reform, effectively abolished concrete rules of marital commitment, leaving
the standard of behavior to be interpreted by spouses themselves. This legal move, together with
the trend toward de-privileging marriage, may have inadvertently undermined beneficial norms
that contributed to marital stability.
It is clear that traditional family law reinforced commitment norms and that they have
become much weaker in the no-fault era. It is less clear, however, whether any legal reform
would be effective or beneficial. Although the commitment norms and gender norms that regulate
the marriage relationship are analytically distinct, they became interwoven (perhaps inextricably)
and embedded in traditional spousal roles. Thus, efforts to reintroduce legal enforcement of
spousal commitment (such as covenant marriage) are presumed by opponents to be associated
with regressive social policies and gender stereotypes. In contrast, legal enforcement of
commitment norms that define parental obligation have not triggered associations with the
inequity and coercion of traditional marital roles, a difference that may facilitate the positive
response to the legal regulation of parenting.
The “bundling” of gender and commitment norms in marriage points to a more general
obstacle to the state functioning as a norm manager in the family context. Marriage has become
a battleground in the culture wars, pitting cultural and religious conservatives against political
liberals and feminists. This polarization tends to silence the expression of intrinsic preferences by
individuals who seek to avoid informal sanctions.10 In an environment in which public discourse
tends to mask private preferences, predicting responses to legal policy initiatives becomes highly
problematic. I suggest that the response to covenant marriage (and to other family law reforms)
may reflect this dynamic. Thus, while it is possible to tell a plausible story about the law’s past

10

For an enlightening analysis of how preference disguise make the prediction of social change difficult, see Timur
Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification 174, 347 (1995).
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influence on the social norms surrounding marriage, predictions about the impact of future legal
reforms are far more uncertain.
This essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, I develop a taxonomy of marital norms and of
the mechanics of norm enforcement that clarifies the complex scheme of normative regulation. In
Part II, I suggest the means by which law can affect marital norms, using the traditional legal
framework as a case study. Part III traces the modern social history of marriage through the
evolution of marital norms and the dramatic changes in the legal regulation of the marital
relationship. Using this analytic framework, in Part IV, I argue that norm bundling explains the
puzzling variations in the effects of the legal reform movement on contemporary marital norms. I
conclude that the complexity of the interaction of law and norms in marriage together with the
problem of disguised preferences frustrate efforts to use explanatory theories of how law
influences norms to predict the consequences of future changes in the legal regulation of marriage.

I. THE NORMATIVE STRUCTURE OF TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE
Marriage is a status in which a couple, usually through a formal ceremony, agree to be
subject to a complex set of behavioral expectations defining the roles of spouse and parent,
expectations that will restrict their freedom and guide their behavior in the relationship. Although
other roles in life involve a similar formal change in status that is accompanied by voluntary
agreement to be bound by a set of norms, few are as broad in scope or as commonly experienced.11
As in other norm contexts, the social norms surrounding marriage create in the individual spouse a
sense of obligation stimulated in part by the recognition that violations result in sanctions both in
the form of self-imposed guilt and disapproval by the spouse and other members of the
community.12 The way in which these norms function is both interdependent and complex. To

11

Entering military service or becoming president are similarly all-encompassing roles that are formally assumed.

12

The definition of “social norm” has not been free from controversy. Some of the debate focuses over whether
conventions or behavioral regularities constitute norms. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex
Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643, 1656-57;
Richard McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338, 350-51 (1997).
Richard McAdams’ definition is simple, but satisfactory , for my purposes. “[N]orms...refer to behavioral regularities
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appreciate this complexity and its consequences, I develop in this Part a taxonomy of the norms
that gave traditional marriage its social meaning and of the mechanisms by which marital norms are
enforced.
A. A Taxonomy of Marital Norms
The set of norms which the spouses adopt and by which they agree to be bound in
traditional marriage includes both commitment norms and gender norms, which together regulate
both the spousal and the parental roles.13 Spousal commitment norms prescribe the general
obligations of spouses to one another, while a somewhat different set of commitment norms define
parental obligations. Commitment norms deter selfish behavior and encourage the alignment of
individual interest with that of the spouse or child. Gender norms regulate the roles of women as
wives and mothers and of men as husbands and fathers. There is substantial overlap in the
obligations created by commitment and gender norms, which have historically been intricately
intertwined. I will argue, however, that the two types of norms are quite different in their function
and in their utility. Commitment norms assist the couple to achieve their mutual goal of a lasting,
cooperative, intimate relationship, and motivate both spouses to act in their children’s interest. The
utility of gender norms is tenuous; they have tended to reinforce women’s dependency, and to
structure marriage as a relationship that serves the interests of husbands, but subordinates that of
wives. Commitment norms are essential to successful marriage, as it is conventionally understood,
while gender norms for the most part are, or should be, severable and expendable.
1. Commitment Norms
a. Spousal Commitment Norms. Spousal commitment norms restrict individual

that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal
sanctions, or both.” Id at 340. Creation of a sense of obligation to behave as expected is the key attribute, in my view,
together with the expectation of informal community enforcement. Norms also are often, but not always, self- enforced
through guilt. I do not include conventions in my definition of norms. Thus, the conventions and traditions surrounding
marriage - - the wedding ceremony and reception; announcements; and wedding and engagement rings, for example - are not norms, because noncompliance carries no sanction. These conventions and traditions are important symbolically
and have a signaling function- - but, on my view, they are not norms. See infra note _.
13
Note that this taxonomy categorizes norms in traditional marriage, and thus is the historic baseline against which
norm change is examined. As will become clear, although I use the present tense, it is not meant to describe
contemporary marriage.
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freedom for the purpose of discouraging selfish behavior and encouraging each spouse to identify
her own interest with that of the other. At the outset, I assume that commitment norms regulate
the behavior of husbands and wives evenhandedly - - i.e., that each spouse voluntarily agrees (by
getting married) to be bound by the same behavioral restrictions, and that each will be subject to
similar sanctions for violation. I also assume that, although the couple customizes the social norms
regulating marriage to some extent, the commitment framework creates a template of standards
and rules which generally guides marital behavior. This is not to say that commitment norms
function as an onerous burden, coercively imposed on the married couple by an intrusive
community. To the contrary, these mechanisms are assumed voluntarily, and function to promote
cooperation in marriage; they assist the couple to achieve their ambitious goal of a mutually
satisfying, lasting, intimate relationship. Indeed, a hypothetical couple, presented with the task of
devising a set of behavioral expectations designed to optimize the prospect of successful marriage,
would likely replicate the existing collection of commitment norms.
The couple entering marriage face a significant challenge despite their emotional bond and
firm resolution that their relationship will endure. Each believes that the marriage will serve
individual long-term interests and that the prospect of a happy life together promises substantial
payoffs. Both understand, however, that investing substantial financial and emotional resources in
a single, exclusive long-term relationship is a risky venture. They know that each will be tempted
many times to behave in ways that undermine the stability of the marriage, and they believe that
selfish behavior, although it sometimes promotes individual short-term interest, threatens their
mutual and individual long-term interest--and their marriage.
If this is a plausible account of the dilemma facing the couple contemplating marriage, then
commitment norms represent a response which allow the couple to make credible commitments to
one another, reducing the risk of opportunistic behavior and defection. These norms function as
both precommitment and commitment. They reinforce the intentions of each spouse to behave
cooperatively; they also provide security for the marital investment through the assurance that the
other spouse is similarly bound. Some commitment norms are expressions in marriage of standards
of behavior much like those that promote cooperation in long-term commercial or social
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relationships --norms of reciprocity, solidarity, loyalty, honesty, and trustworthiness.14 The marital
obligation is more extensive than is that of business partners or friends, of course, reflecting the
broader scope and intimacy of the relationship. For example, loyalty is expected of business
partners, but loyalty in marriage requires giving the highest priority to the relationship, with the
expectation that it will last for life. Other marital norms encourage sexual fidelity, openness,
emotional sharing and altruism. These are less important (or irrelevant) in the commercial
context, creating behavioral expectations that define this intimate personal relationship and
promote its stability. Commitment norms express as general standards of behavior what each
spouse can expect of the other (as well as guidelines for self management). Often, these broad
norms also are particularized in concrete behavioral rules.15
Commitment norms serve a bonding function in that each spouse, by agreeing to adhere
to the behavioral expectations embodied in the norms, makes herself vulnerable to heavy costs
should she later defect.16 For example, marriage is subject to norms of open communication and
truth telling. These norms promote trust and interdependence which reinforce the emotional bond,
but which can be expected to exacerbate the disruption of divorce. The sharing of intimate
personal information serves another bonding function, with each spouse holding the other’s secrets
hostage and both anticipating that disclosure (in a divorce proceeding, for example) would be

14

Several scholars have examined the operation of these norms in long term commercial relationships. See Lisa
Bernstein, (1992); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc.Rev.
55 (1963); R. Scott, supra note 3, at 2040-42
15

For example, concrete social norms encourage spouses to avoid extramarital sex, to share financial resources,
household tasks, time, and private thoughts, to keep family secrets, to support each other in sickness and adversity, to
remember anniversaries and birthdays, and to forgive and forget hurt feelings and arguments.

16

Bonding arrangements are self limiting constraints which align the interests of each spouse with the other, by
increasing costs of defection. Monitoring mechanisms, on the other hand, facilitate detection and sanctioning by each
spouse of norm violations by the other. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin Econ. 305, 308 (1976) (describing the use of bonding and
monitoring arrangements to reduce agency costs by managers). The precommitment function is important but underemphasized. Many persons entering marriage aspire to be good spouses (because they love the other spouse, want a
happy marriage, and because it is consistent with their self image, etc.), but realize that they will be tempted to stray
from their self- defined goals. See Elizabeth Scott, Rational Decisionmaking about Marriage and Divorce, 76 Va. L.
Rev. 9 (1990). Norms assist them to stay the course.
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costly.17 Communication and honesty also facilitate mutual monitoring by encouraging disclosure
and information-sharing between spouses. If silence and non-disclosure are assumed to be unusual
behavior, they may be expected to trigger spousal scrutiny.
Similarly, by promising to “forsake all others,” each spouse agrees to be bound by the norm
of sexual fidelity. The mandate to treat marriage as a sexually exclusive relationship prohibits the
spousal behavior that is assumed to represent the greatest threat to maintaining a cooperative
equilibrium in marriage. The broad behavioral standard prescribing marital fidelity has been stable
over time, but its boundaries have been defined through concrete rules that vary in different time
periods and social contexts.18 Not surprisingly, social disapproval of marital infidelity has
traditionally been strong and widespread.19 Thus, the spouse who is tempted to pursue an elicit
encounter anticipates that she will incur significant costs should the adulterous violation be
detected.20 Moreover, because of the widely shared consensus that adultery is bad behavior, the
potential defector can expect both spousal and community monitoring, which increases the
prospect of detection.
Assessment of the social welfare effects of spousal commitment norms requires some
simplifying assumptions. Conformity with these norms will sometimes be inconsistent with short
term interest - - hence, the temptation to act selfishly. However, if enhancing the security and
stability of the relationship is consistent with individual and joint long-term interests, then

17

See Scott & Scott, supra note 4, at 1290. Disclosures of unflattering information shared by spouses during
marriage are a distasteful part of divorce proceedings, as they seem to be motivated by spite. Ex ante, however, the risk
of disclosure makes the communication of the secret an act of trust, and serves as a credible precommitment. Sharing
secrets can function as self enforcing contract terms, where the penalty is triggered by the breach.
18

See Steven Nock, Marriage in Men’s Lives, supra note _ at _. The boundaries of the norm have been quite
variable. For example, for wives, different rules regulate flirting, the meaning of socializing with other men, appropriate
attire, etc., depending on whether the context is a Hasidic community, Manhattan in the 1990's, or the Mid-west in the
1890's.
19

Nock, supra note _ at 22. Surveys have shown Americans view extramarital sex as “more reprehensible” than
most other types of sex. Id. Indeed, 77% of Americans view extramarital sex as “always wrong” Id. It is true, of course,
that sanctions have varied in different historical periods and social groups.
20
These costs include feelings of guilt from internalization of the norm, together with the sanction imposed by the
spouse and the likely disapproval of friends and family. Moreover, the efforts to escape detection induce psychological
costs associated with furtive, sneaky behavior.
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commitment norms can be said to enhance social welfare. This condition may often hold. If,
however, individual long-term interest is not furthered by the normative constraints, the case for
the efficiency of these commitment norms becomes weaker.
b. Norms of Parental Obligation. Traditionally, marriage was the only socially
acceptable venue for producing and raising children, and, even today, the prospect of having a
child will often lead cohabiting couples to marry.21 The parental role is assumed to be an
important part of marriage, and married couples are expected to have children (unless they marry
later in life).22 Parental commitment norms include the shared obligations of parents to rear the
children of marriage to healthy productive adulthood. Parents are obligated to feed, clothe,
shelter, discipline, socialize, educate, support and love their children and to protect them from
harm. Primary responsibility for many parenting tasks traditionally was allocated on a gendered
basis, with residual responsibility in the other parent. Norms of parental obligation, like spousal
commitment norms, are expressed in broad behavioral standards that are particularized through
behavioral rules that may change over time. Changes may reflect new information about child
development, which makes the older rule seem inefficient or harmful. For example, parents of an
earlier generation were unlikely to involve themselves with their children’s athletic activities or
homework, while modern parents feel guilty for missing a soccer game, believing that such
involvement provides psychological benefits to the child.23
Like spousal commitment norms, norms of parental obligation function to deter selfish
behavior, encouraging parents to identify their own interest with that of their children. These
21

See note _ supra. Out-of wedlock parenthood was a serious social offense until relatively recently, creating stigma
for both parent and child. Illegitimate children also suffered from serious legal disabilities, having no inheritance rights,
and no entitlement to paternal support. See Mary Shanley, Unwed Fathers’ Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality:
Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 60, 69-70. Both the stigma of unmarried
parenthood and its responsibilities fell heavily on mothers. Traditionally, unmarried fathers were absolved of legal
duties toward their children.
22

Nock suggests that one of the defining traits of normative marriage is the assumption that the couple will have
children. Nock, supra note _ at 6. This assumption is usually realized. According to Nock only 11% of ever married
women age 44 are childless. Id. at 32.
23
They also may be subject to gossip by other parents if they regularly fail to attend (and admired for faithful
attendance). Similarly, faithful performance of the obligation to provide for children healthy physical development now
requires regular visits to the pediatrician and dentist for preventive examinations.
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norms serve an important function, because the relationship is one in which the parents have
power and authority over their children, who, because of their immaturity, are unable to assert
their own interests.24 In this context (as in the spousal relationship), social norms reinforce bonds
of emotional attachment to reduce conflicts of interest and encourage long term investment in the
relationship. These norms are usually deeply internalized, and failure to perform adequately
generates substantial feelings of guilt. Evidence of poor parenting (as when children are
unsupervised, badly behaved, dirty or undernourished) also generates criticism and social sanctions
by neighbors and other community members. Monitoring parental behavior is difficult, however,
because children usually are not able to monitor or sanction violations themselves, and family
privacy impedes community monitoring.25 Thus, successful norm enforcement depends heavily on
bonding, and particularly on the internalization by parents of their commitment to child rearing.
In general, parental commitment norms serve the beneficial social function of promoting
adequate care for children. They also further an important individual and collective goal that is
shared by spouses in many marriages--the successful rearing of children. By deterring parents
from (hopefully only) occasional selfish behavior and encouraging faithful performance, these
norms promote parents’ utility and enhance social welfare.
2. Gender Norms.
Gender norms created sharply differentiated spousal and parental roles in traditional
marriage. Women have been held primarily responsible for child care and homemaking tasks,
while men were (and are) expected to provide primary financial support for their families.26

24

See Elizabeth Scott & Robert Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 Va. L. Rev. 2401, 2433 (1995). The relationship
between parents and children presents a problem familiar in the regulation of agents in the commercial context. In other
contexts involving analogous power imbalance between principals and agents (such as trust beneficiary and trustee or
shareholders and directors), norms of fiduciary obligation encourage the agent to identify her interest with that of the
principal.
25

Monitoring also plays a role as the parent anticipates that spouses and neighbors may detect violations either by
observing parental behavior directly, or indirectly by observing the children. Child abuse reporting statutes encourage
neighbors, teachers, and others to monitor parents’ behavior and report gross deficiencies. Cite
26
I describe gender norms as part of traditional marriage and thus use the past tense. These norms of course continue
to shape roles in contemporary marriage. See Nock, supra note _, at 58-59; Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 Va. L. Rev. 509 (1998).
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Gendered spousal roles were hierarchical. The husband was the head of the household, with
primary authority over its resources, location, and general governance decisions. An array of
marital norms encouraged the husband to exercise authority in the family (“wearing the pants” as it
were) and the wife to submit cheerfully and to provide domestic services to her husband so that he
could successfully fulfill his breadwinner role. Gendered parental norms are more complicated.
Mothers raising their children performed an important and respected social function, which also
gave her authority in the family. This role also contributed to inequality in marriage, however,
because it reinforced women’s financial dependency on their husbands.27 The “good” wife and
mother devoted her efforts to serving her husband’s and family’s needs, subordinating her own
interests and preferences, while the husband’s role encouraged him to equate family interest with
fulfillment of his individual wage earner goals. Further, as I will argue below, the wife’s
dependency and husband’s autonomy functioned to bind them differentially to the marriage,
indirectly skewing the application of spousal commitment norms, and resulting in greater
restrictions on the freedom of wives than of husbands.
Are gender norms efficient? Like other marital norms, gender norms regulate behavior to
encourage spouses to fulfill the obligations of their marital roles faithfully. From one perspective,
role division promises efficiency as each spouse invests human capital in developing the skills
associated with a narrow range of functions.28 The efficiency of divided roles is undermined if the
stability of marriage becomes uncertain, however, because much of the wife’s investment is not
transferrable. Efficiency aside, the fairness of gender norms and roles is questionable. Unlike
commitment norms, gender norms either inherently or implicitly tend to subordinate the interest of
wives to that of husbands and subject spouses to unequal treatment. Spousal and parental
commitment norms can be understood as mechanisms that predictably might evolve by spousal

27

Ultimately, mothers’ responsibility for child care has been the principle obstacle to equality with men in the
workforce (and thus economic and political equality). Joan Williams argues persuasively that radical reform of the model
of the “ideal worker,” is necessary for real change. Currently, the role of ideal worker presumes minimal family
responsibilities, making the role one that many mothers can not fulfill. See Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why
Family and Work Conflict and What to Do about It (2000).
28

Gary Becker and other economists have argued for the efficiency of gendered role division in marriage. Gary S.
Becker, A Treatise on the Family 30-53 (enlarged ed. 1991); Elisabeth S. Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. Legal
Stud. 35 (1978). See also Ira Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 3, 40-47 (1989)
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agreement because they serve the mutual objectives of the parties. In contrast, it is difficult to
understand why parties in a Rawlsean original position, ignorant of their future assigned gender
roles, would agree to gender norms (especially spousal norms) in marriage.29
Gender norms were closely interwoven with commitment norms in defining the traditional
roles of husband and wife. This “bundling” of norms is most obvious in the context of parental
obligation, where most responsibility fell on mothers, and fathers’ duties, aside from financial
support, were residual. Spousal commitment norms were not formally gendered, but in a variety
of ways they functioned to constrain the behavior of wives more than husbands. Sometimes the
threatened sanction was disproportionately harsher for wives than husbands. For example,
violation of sexual fidelity norms carried far higher social costs for women than for men.30 More
subtly, the gendered structure of marriage differentially encouraged conformity to commitment
expectations. Because the wife’s gendered marital tasks created human capital that was marriagespecific, marital stability was more tangibly critical to her welfare. The stakes were higher for her,
because the costs of marital dissolution were higher. Finally, the behavioral objectives of
commitment norms-- to discourage selfish behavior and encourage each spouse to identify selfinterest with that of the other-- is fully compatible with wives’ gendered obligations, but in tension
with the autonomy- enhancing roles of husbands.31 Thus, wives may submit to these norms more
readily than husbands, a response that may exacerbate inequality.

29

Gender norms do not seem to reflect the efficiency and welfare enhancing quality that norms scholars predict will
characterize informal social control mechanisms that solve community collective action problems. Rather, they may
represent another category identified by sociologists and anthropologists -- norms that emerge to serve the interests of
powerful interest groups in society. See Jean Ensminger & Jack Knight, Changing social Norms: Common Property,
Bridewealth, and Clan Exogamy, 38 Current Anthropology 1 (Feb. 1997).
30

At common law, adultery was an offense only if the woman was married. Adultery by a married woman interfered
with her husband’s property interest in his wife, including his interest her sexual services. Melissa Ash Haggard, Note:
Adultery: A Comparison Of Military Law And State Law And The Controversy This Causes Under Our Constitution
And Criminal Justice System, 37 Brandeis L.J. 469, 470-72 (1998). See also, Jeremy D. Weinstein, Adultery, Law, and
the State: A History, 38 Hastings L.J. 195 (1986)(chronicling the historical development of adultery laws and how they
favored men.
31
The symbolic importance of the traditional custom of wives assuming husbands’ surnames and of the wearing of
wedding rings by wives, but not husbands, captures the “contamination” of commitment norms by gender norms. The
modern tradition of exchange of wedding rings suggests evolution toward marriage as an egalitarian relationship binding
both parties. See Margaret F. Brinig, Rings & Promises, 6 J.L. Econ & Org 203 (1990).
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B. The Enforcement Structure of Marital Norms
The complexity of the normative structure regulating marriage is mirrored in the equally
complex enforcement structure. The elaborate ceremony and distinctive customs surrounding
marriage set the stage for enforcement of marital obligations. These traditions serve several
functions. First, the ceremonial change of status memorializes the couple’s explicit (and implicit)
agreement to be subject to marital norms, and thus reinforces both the bonding and monitoring
functions of the normative structure. Further, the couple’s exchange of promises directly to one
another and before their community underscores the multi-layered structure of enforcement. The
parties understand that marital norms will be enforced on four levels – through individual
precommitment to abide by the obligations, and through spousal and community sanctions, and
ultimately (if informal mechanisms fail) through legal enforcement. The role of spousal
enforcement underscores the complexity of marital norms and of the enforcement structure. In a
real sense, the married couple constitute a distinct norm community, functioning within the larger
community.
1. The customs and traditions of marriage
By exchanging wedding rings and ceremonial promises, the couple bind themselves to one
another in a way that signals both the seriousness of their intentions to undertake the many
obligations of marriage and their non-availability for other intimate relations.32 Through the
solemn public expression of enduring commitment, each spouse signals that s\he is what Eric
Posner has called a “good type,” a reliable person who can be counted on for the long haul.33 This
public announcement expresses a mutual willingness to be held accountable for faithful
performance and to be subject to sanctions should they later defect.
Wedding traditions underscore that spousal accountability extends to the community as

32

The wedding ring serves both bonding and monitoring functions. It functions as a precommitment (and thus as a
bonding arrangement) because it is likely to reduce the incidence of future temptation (and thus defection), by signaling
to outsiders that the spouse is unavailable for an intimate relationship. It also promotes monitoring, by inviting third
parties to evaluate behavior against the expectations of married persons. These functions underscore the importance of
the traditional convention of wives, but not husbands, wearing wedding rings.
33

See E. Posner, supra note _ at 260 note, supra As Posner and others have pointed out, marriage serves a signaling
function, which allows individuals with low discount rates (and thus serious intentions for a long term relationship) to
identify one another. It thus facilitates efficient matching. Id.; Bishop, supra 9, at 250; Trebilcock, supra note 9, at 250.
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well as to the partner. Engagement banns, engagement and wedding announcements, and the
participation of family and friends in the wedding ceremony all suggest the importance of
community witness to the mutual expression of commitment. Weddings are important celebrations
in which the couple symbolically invites the community to monitor their future marital behavior.34
The ceremonial rite of passage underscores the fact that both the spouse and the community now
have expectations and an enforceable stake in future marital behavior.
2. Self-enforcement
The vows undertaken by each spouse in the marriage ceremony are the basis for self
enforcement of marital norms. Long before marriage, however, most individuals are familiar with
the traditions and ceremony, and are socialized to understand the importance of the behavioral
expectations for the role of husband or wife. Thus, for many people, the social meaning of
marriage and the associated behavioral expectations have become internalized by the time they
consider marriage themselves.35 The ceremony itself may reinforce that internalization process, so
that the individual enters marriage resolved to fulfill the obligations of the spousal role--a
resolution that is intensified and supported by a strong emotional bond to the spouse. Thereafter,
engaging in behavior that is harmful to the other’s interests is likely to result in feelings of guilt, a
sanction that operates even if the misbehavior goes undetected by others.
Self enforcement thus plays a particularly important role in marriage. Given the broad
scope of the relationship and the complexity of marital obligations, it is difficult for others
(including the spouse) to detect norm violations. The privacy and intimacy of the relationship
limits monitoring by outsiders, and excessive monitoring between the spouses threatens to

34

All norm enforcement by third parties involves monitoring, and the imposition of sanctions for violations. To
describe community enforcement of marital norms as employing monitoring arrangements as that term is understood in
agency theory is particularly apt, because the of the voluntary contractual nature of the change of status which subjects
the couples to the norms. Jenson & Meckling_ supra note _ at 308.
35

Although girls may be socialized to understand the expectations in marriage to a greater extent than boys, the
ceremonial bachelor party shortly before the wedding suggests that the meaning of the impending change of status is
salient for men as well as for women.
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undermine the relationship.36 Thus, self enforcement of marital norms through guilt is essential to
maintaining a cooperative equilibrium.
3. Relational Norms--Enforcement within Marriage
Marriage itself --the relationship between the spouses--is a distinct norm community, a
fact that complicates the system of norm definition and enforcement in this context. The married
couple live together intimately in an exclusive relationship, interacting frequently over a long
period of time. Thus, their relationship with each other is different both in quality and scope from
their relationship with the larger community.
Each married couple develops a complex set of expectations, and patterns of behavior that
evolve over time. Through these “relational norms,” the couple pursue the goal of a stable
cooperative relationship, by devising behavioral rules that reflect their individual values and
preferences (and each party’s relative power in the relationship). Thus, a couple may have specific
expectations about performance of household duties, behavior in social settings, reconciliation
after arguments, how leisure time is spent, and many other matters. Some relational norms are
enforced only by the spouses themselves.37 Indeed, outsiders may not be aware of many of the
rules and understandings that are important in promoting cooperation in a marriage. Thus, for
example, a couple may have an private understanding that the more outgoing spouse should not
abandon the timid spouse at big social gatherings. Other relational norms, such as the norm of
sexual fidelity, create expectations about appropriate marital behavior that are broadly applicable
and are enforced by the community as well as by the spouses. Both variations are derived from the
commitment and gender norms described earlier.38

36

The norm of trust complements norms that restrict marital behavior so as to inspire trust. It seems fair to say that
excessive monitoring of a spouse’s behavior signals trouble in the marriage.
37

This underscores the fact the marriage itself is a norm community (with only the spouses as members) within
the larger community.
38

In earlier work, Robert Scott and I treated the first type of relational norms as a category distinct from broader social
norms (which we called societal norms) See Scott & Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract . I am now inclined to
think that these norms are simply customized rules derived from the broader social norms regulating marriage, and that
what is distinctive about them is that they are only enforced by the spouses and not by the broader community. For
example, the community expects loyalty between spouses. What loyalty requires in a given marriage (“don’t leave me at
the party”) may vary among married couples. Couples may also customize to a certain extent marital norms that are
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The enforcement of relational norms by spouses is a complex, dynamic process of
continuous interaction. I have previously analyzed marriage as a two person strategic interaction
game of indefinite duration.39 Game theory predicts that the couple may be able to maintain a
stable equilibrium by using a tit-for-tat strategy, one in which each spouse returns cooperation
with cooperation, punishes norm violations when they occur, and then returns to cooperation in
subsequent interactions.40 The emotional bond of marriage and the intensity of interaction
distinguishes it from other relationships in ways that may increase the variance between
cooperation and defection. Since, for each spouse, the other’s esteem is uniquely important, the
withholding of esteem through anger or withdrawal is a particularly effective sanction.41
Moreover, the foundation of affection and commitment inclines both spouses towards cooperation
initially, and facilitates a return to cooperation after a norm violation has been punished. On the
other hand, the intensity of the emotional bond can make even trivial violations particularly
hurtful (think of the forgotten birthday), sometimes leading to excessive retaliation which can
trigger a destabilizing spiral of mutual recriminations. In this context, the background norm of

enforced by the community. For example, the general norm of sexual fidelity is enforced by third parties. In a given
marriage, the couple’s understanding may be that flirting with others is permitted behavior or that it constitutes a serious
violation. With powerful norms, such as sexual fidelity, the variations are likely to hover around a mean. A good
example of the general conservatism is the response to “open marriage,” a model of marriage advocated enthusiastically
in the 1970's, in which the norm of sexual fidelity was greatly relaxed. See Nena O’Neill & George O’Neill, Open
Marriage: A New Life Style For Couples (1972). The skeptical reaction and the short-lived interest (and the divorce of
the authors) suggest that important marital norms can not be dramatically customized.
Couples sometimes devise customized rules for marriage that are contrary to societal expectations under commitment or
gender norms. Thus, a couple may agree that the wife will be the wage earner and the husband the homemaker. Within
the norm community of a particular marriage, this role allocation may be deemed optimal, despite disapproval of the
broader community. Deviations from dominant norms occur in many norm contexts, when small groups (utopian
communities and delinquent gangs, for example) adopt norms that are inconsistent with those of the broader society.
39

Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decision-making in Marriage and Divorce, -Va. L. Rev. -(1989).
40

See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 30- 33 (1984) (describing patterns of cooperation in an
iterated game); R. Scott, supra note 3, at 2009-2030 (developing a game-theoretic model to distribute risk in long-term
contractual relationships)
41
I am persuaded by Richard McAdams’ argument that people comply with norms in part because they care about the
esteem of others. See McAdams, supra note 14, at 355-57. This approach is not incompatible with Eric Posner’s
signaling analysis. Posner, supra note 9, at 260-62. A husband may give his wife an expensive gift out of
straightforward devotion or to signal that he is a good husband. Assuming the latter motivation dominates, desire to
retain or enhance esteem may be an incentive.
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enduring loyalty and the expectation of a lifelong relationship play a particularly important role,
facilitating escape from a pattern of destructive interactions and a return to a cooperative
equilibrium.
4. Community Enforcement
Although the effectiveness of norm enforcement rests heavily on the extent of
internalization by the spouses and the couple’s ability to maintain a cooperative equilibrium
through mutual enforcement, it depends also on whether the couple anticipate reputational harm
or other social sanctions for defection.42 Because marital privacy is highly valued in our society,
the community enforcement role is somewhat limited. Nonetheless, marital commitment and
gender norms traditionally were the subject of broad societal consensus, and couples could expect
community monitoring of their performance and censure for violations.
Even where such a consensus exists, however, the effectiveness of community regulation
will vary depending on how strongly marital norms are endorsed in the couple’s immediate social
context. A couple’s community could include extended family, neighbors, social group, or
religious community, and several communities can overlap in enforcing marital norms.43 In a
small highly integrated community that strongly endorses marital norms, the societal consensus

42

Community norm sanctions can include gossip, criticism, social ostracism, and financial penalties, such as a refusal
to do business with a norm violator. Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 208-11
(1991). Violation of marital norms can damage professional advancement. Consider the derailing of the appointment of
Army General Joseph Ralston to the position of Joint Chiefs of Staff, when it was revealed that he engaged in
extramarital affairs. See General’s Affair Re-Ignites Debate Over policy, USA Today, June 6, 1997, at 1A. Marv Albert
lost his position as an NBA Commentator on NBC when it revealed in a divorce proceeding that he physically assaulted
his wife. He has subsequently returned to broadcasting. Marylyn Schwartz, A Shot Most Foul: What's Marv Albert
doing on NBC?, Houston Chron., December 20, 1999, at 2.
Violation of marital norms can be punished severely in the political arena, viz Nelson Rockefeller, who was humiliated
at the Republican presidential convention in 1964 because he was divorced. He was harassed during his campaign
because of his divorce and subsequent re-marriage to a woman who gave up custody of her four children from a
previous marriage. Cite Remember also Hillary Rodham Clinton, whose suggestion in her husband’s 1992 campaign
that her role was not to stay home and bake cookies generated intense criticism. See, e.g., Steve Rubenstein, Having
Cookies, Tea Can be Hard Lot, San. Fran. Chron, March 27, 1992, at D24.
43

One key factor in norm enforcement is the couple’s degree of integration in the community. Another might be the
extent to which the various communities are consistent in their values that implicate marital norms.
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will be amplified, and norm enforcement predictably will be highly effective.44 Small communities
are effective norm enforcers for several reasons. Monitoring is facilitated because community
members all know one another and interact on an ongoing basis. This is important in several
ways. Community members themselves are motivated to enforce norms to gain reputational
benefits as supporters of approved norms.45 Moreover, sanctions are particularly effective
because in a small community, the potential norm violator is likely to value highly the esteem of
community members.46 In contrast, if the couple’s community only weakly endorses marital
norms, or if their various communities express different attitudes (sending inconsistent signals),47
or if the couple’s social affiliations are tenuous, then social expectations will play a much weaker
role in enforcing marital obligations.48 Each spouse’s intentions to perform faithfully may be
undermined if they observe others in their social world violating marital norms without cost. The
couple come to expect of each other (and of themselves) what their social community seems to
expect of married couples.49

II. THE INFLUENCE OF LEGAL REGULATION ON NORMATIVE MARRIAGE
A. Legal Influence on Family Norms
Specifying the impact of the legal regime on the norms surrounding marriage is a
44

Ellickson, supra note 48, at 135.

45

Norm scholars have suggested that a secondary norm develops to encourage norm enforcement, because community
members do not want to be sanctioned as one who is tolerant of defectors from important norms. McAdams argues that
norm enforcement works, because all that is required is the withholding of esteem from the violator, an act which is
relatively costless. McAdams, supra note 14, at 372-75; Cooter, supra note 14, at 1645-46.
46

Richard McAdams makes this point in explaining why individuals (gang members, for example) conform to the
norms of a social subgroup that are inconsistent with the norms endorsed by society. Gang members care more about
their reputation within the gang than about societal approval. McAdams, supra note 14, at 386-90.
47

For example, the couple’s family may strongly endorse marital norms, while their social group is indifferent.

48

Even in an era when marital norms generally were strongly enforced, the level of enforcement varied in different
contexts (as it does today). Thus, community enforcement predictably would play a more modest role on the behavior of
city dwellers, Hollywood celebrities, and people who move frequently, or have no family and few friends. It might be a
more powerful force in a small town or a conservative religious community.
49

See Hardin, supra note 5, at 36-37.
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speculative undertaking, one that is complicated by the fact that family relationships are generally
understood to be outside the domain of direct legal regulation. Direct legal coercion is not
commonly employed to enforce family obligations in intact marriages, even on matters that are
subject to legal regulation.50 For the most part, legal enforcement occurs only when family
relations break down, either due to divorce or to major defections from acceptable behavior (like
assault or abuse). At first glance, therefore, it would seem that, in regulating family relationships,
law and social norms operate (largely) in two separate and distinct spheres.51
In reality, the law functions in two ways to influence the social norms surrounding
marriage. First, the legal enforcement of family obligations constitutes the outer layer of the
enforcement structure described above. The law sanctions serious norm violations when informal
enforcement is inadequate, and through feedback mechanisms, deters defection and strengthens
norms. Second, the law plays a role in defining marital norms and in influencing their evolution.
Claims about the extent to which the law has influenced norms in this setting, or even the
direction of the influence, must be tentative. Nonetheless, it seems clear that a dialectical pattern
characterizes the interaction between social norms and the law, and that they regulate marital
behavior in tandem.
1. The Role of Law in the Enforcement of Norms
The role of law in enforcing family obligation is generally invoked when family
relationships have broken down. It is well understood that legal enforcement is particularly
important upon termination of long term relationships, when the parties’ interests are no longer
aligned, and the effectiveness of informal mechanisms for enforcing obligations declines (or

50

Thus, absent dire circumstances, the husband’s traditional legal duty to support his wife was not enforced during
marriage. McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953) (court refuses to sanction husband for failure to
provide wife with basic amenities, despite financial means to do so.)
51

This is the pattern which Lisa Bernstein observes (and argues for) among diamond merchants and others, agree not
to subject disputes to litigation. Bernstein, supra note _, at 1796-1815. In their analysis of the employment relationship,
Edward Rock and Michael Wachter argue that parties should be allowed to choose between law (contractual obligation)
and norms, and that courts should not enforce the norm against discharge without cause. The Enforceability of Norms
and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. Pa L. Rev. 1913 (1996)
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disappears).52 The availability of legal enforcement also has an ex ante effect which is the key to
its role in reinforcing norms. It operates as a feedback mechanism, discouraging defection and
encouraging behavior according to normative prescriptions. For example, the parent who is
inclined to violate a norm of parental obligation by inflicting severe physical punishment on her
child (and for whom the temptation would override concern about informal enforcement by
spouse and neighbors), may be deterred by the anticipation of legal intervention or the loss of
custody of the child. In this sense, legal enforcement represents a final (and powerful) layer of
enforcement in a multilayered system.53
Changes in the level of legal sanctions can strengthen a weak norm, and even influence
norm change. Imposing stronger or different legal sanctions reinforces informal enforcement
mechanisms and it may clarify an emerging norm consensus where behavioral expectations may
have previously been uncertain. A good example of the dynamics of this process is the recent
trend toward criminal prosecution in domestic violence cases. Acts of domestic violence have
been the subject of increasing social censure, as advocacy groups, acting as “norm entrepreneurs,”
have publicized information about the harms to women.54 But community enforcement has not
been particularly effective owing to the power imbalance between offender and victim and the
secrecy of the behavior. Although domestic assaults were legally prohibited, enforcement was lax
historically. As the social norm strengthened, political pressure increased for more effective legal
enforcement. Research evidence suggests that although the effectiveness of legal reforms that
promote criminal arrest and prosecution has been mixed, the response has been positive among
potential offenders with community ties - -a group for whom anticipated reputational harms may
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R. Scott, supra note _ at _ E. Scott & R. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract. In general, this is why the
state enforces many marital obligations on divorce (such as spousal and child support) which are enforced through
informal means during marriage.
53

Other examples are legal enforcement of the child support obligation and of spousal commitment norms, as I will
discuss in Part III.
54
Law suits against police departments, protests, and other publicity by advocates lead to changes in how police deal
with domestic violence, and general changes in attitudes about husbands’ rights to physically assault their wives. Ellman
et. al., supra note 59, at 163, 171. These advocates were norm entrepreneurs, leaders who aim to influence and shape
norms by criticizing existing norms and behavior. See McAdams, supra note 16, at 394-95; Sunstein, supra note 10, at
909-12, 929..
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carry substantial weight.55
Sometimes legal sanctions function not only to strengthen social norms but also to
stimulate informal enforcement. Consider, for example, a policy enacted by the Virginia Child
Support Enforcement Agency.56 The agency recently began disabling the vehicles of parents who
are delinquent in their child support payments, by installing well marked pink and blue boots. The
boots serve as a conventional legal enforcement tool- - the vehicle can not be reclaimed until the
payments are made. They also presumably serve to shame the defector among friends, neighbors
and colleagues, thus encouraging informal community enforcement. Predictably, this policy will
promote compliance, not only because the obligor parent anticipates the loss of his car, but also
because he wants to avoid community disapproval.
2. The Role of Law in Defining and Influencing Norms
Beyond (or together with) its enforcement role, legal regulation can play a role in shaping
normative behavior in marriage in at least three ways.57 First, legal rules can clarify and announce
the specific behavioral expectations embodied in social norms. The state can also influence norm
change through deregulation, by withdrawing legal rules that define family obligation, and thereby
weakening the norms that are reinforced by those rules. Finally, the state, through the law’s
expressive function, subtly shapes the definition of marital roles and norms even while leaving
enforcement to the existing normative structure.
Legal regulation functions to particularize the broader behavioral standards embodied in

55

Larry Sherman, Policing Domestic Violence: Experiments & Dilemmas (1992); Jeffrey Fagan et. al., The Specific
Deterrent Effects of Arrest on Aggression against Intimates, Criminology (in press); Bobby Brame Studies of
initiatives by communities to respond to domestic violence incidents with criminal arrest indicate that men who have ties
to the community (through employment, long residence etc.) are deterred by community enforcement. This is not
surprising, since these men are likely to value community esteem and to anticipate high reputational costs from further
incidents. Further, the anticipated loss of employment is likely to serve as an effective deterrant.
56

57

It is apparent that no clear line distinguishes the state’s role in reinforcing marital norms through legal
enforcement and its role in influencing the direction of norm change. As the example of domestic violence prosecution
suggests, legal enforcement may facilitate the emergence of a norm that otherwise might evolve differently.
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social norms.58 Bright-line legal rules clarify precisely what behavior is required of spouses and
parents under the relevant norm.59 For example, parents are subject to an abstract commitment
norm encouraging them to educate their children and prepare them to be productive citizens. In
the early 20th century, compulsory school attendance statutes defined one requirement for
complying with the norm. Before these laws were enacted, parents interpreted the norm according
to their own values and exigencies. The attendance law signaled parents that compliance with the
norm required a concrete minimum amount of schooling (until age 16, usually), and that
withdrawing a child from school at a younger age violated the norm. These laws affected behavior
directly by sanctioning parents who violated them. Eventually, the legal requirement was
internalized by parents, establishing a baseline of what good parenting required. At that point,
most parents would have felt guilty if they violated the norm, and would disapprove of parents
who cheated on this obligation.
Bright-line legal rules that particularize an abstract norm serve principally to clarify and to
amplify the normative prescription. Whether the legal mandate influences the normative
landscape will depend in part on whether the new rule is broadly consistent with community
expectations about the kind behavioral obligations required under the norm.60 Resistance is
predictable and legal enforcement is likely to be costly if the legal requirement departs
substantially from the expectations created by the norm standard.61 Thus, a compulsory
attendance statute that required school attendance until age 21 likely would be ineffective in
influencing parental commitment norms.
The state might also affect norm change when a bright-line rule that previously reinforced
an existing normative standard is abolished. If the abandoned legal rule expressed a concrete
prescription for behavior under the norm, deregulation may create uncertainty about what
58

This insight was first noted by Richard McAdams. Id at 402.
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Id. At 407-08. McAdams uses the example of laws requiring the use of child safety restraints in cars.
60

As I indicate below, preference disguise makes the assessment of community opinion difficult, and the
prediction about the impact of legal reform uncertain. See t.a.n. _ to _ infra.
61

Paul Robinson and John Darley argue that to be effective, criminal law should track social norms. Justice,
Liability, and Blame (1995)

24

constitutes acceptable conduct under the standard. Deregulation may be seen as signaling the
community that the old norm is obsolete, or at least not worthy of legal legitimacy.62 Thus, for
example, the replacement of the tender years presumption with the best interest standard as the
decision rule for resolving child custody disputes may be understood as signaling legal support for
more egalitarian parenting roles.
Some norms scholars have argued that law influences norms through its expressive
function.63 Although claims about this role of law are speculative, it seems plausible that law
influences marital attitudes and behavior beyond or apart from its legal enforcement function.
Indeed, the expressive function of the law seems particularly salient in the family law context,
because legal prescriptions often are not formally enforced. The role of legal regulation in the
evolution of gender norms provides a good example. The traditional endorsement of sharply
differentiated gender norms in marriage only occasionally involved legal enforcement. Much of its
importance was expressive. The law gave family governance authority to husbands and implicitly
assigned family roles, while discouraging women from functioning in the public sphere. The
necessaries doctrine,64 the tender years presumption,65 the husband’s duty of support and
authority to decide marital domicile, and the denial to women of access to professions and of the
right to vote expressed and supported hierarchical gender roles and norms with little legal

62

This in turn may encourage norm violation by those who privately disliked the old norm, but feared social sanction.
Increased deviation and uncertainty about the viability of the norm may increase third party enforcement costs, thus
discouraging enforcement. See t.a.n. _ to _ infra.
63

See Sunstein, Pildes. An interesting debate has emerged in the legal literature over the viability of expressive
theories of law. Pildes, Pildes & Anderson, Adler (in press). I do not mean to engage the claims for or against the
robustness of such theories. I join a number of norms scholars in assuming that the law influences and reinforces social
norms at some level through its expressive function, although measuring the influence may not be possible. Sunstein,
McAdams, Cooter. Robert Cooter equates the creation of norms (by courts) with the expression of social values.
Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. Legal Studies 585, 585-6 (1998). For my purposes, the law’s influence
on social norms through its expressive function simply describes impact on norms other than that created directly by
legal sanction.
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This doctrine allowed merchants to sue husbands for the costs of necessaries provided to his wife creating an
indirect remedy for a wife whose husband failed to provide support. Ira M. Ellman, et. al, Family Law: Cases, Text,
Problems 138 (3 ed. 1998).
65

The tender years presumption presumes that it is in the interest of young children to continue in the care of their
mother, who was thus usually awarded custody, unless unfit. Id. at 614-616.

25

intervention in the “private” realm of the family.66 Today, the state’s attitude toward marital roles
and norms is strongly egalitarian, but again its importance is largely expressive and facilitative,
shaping attitudes rather than directly motivating spousal behavior.
The mechanisms by which law through its expressive function influences social norms are
unclear, and the extent of influence impossible to measure. Moreover, causation issues are
complicated, as norms and law interact through complex feedback mechanisms. Sometimes the
law simply communicates a settled normative consensus, and independent legal influence is hard
to detect. But, as Richard McAdams argues, a legal enactment can also publicize a new
consensus about desirable behavior,67 or even, I would suggest, push public opinion toward that
new consensus. The legal reforms directed toward promoting gender equality would seem to
belong in the last category.
B. The Legal Framework of Traditional Marriage: A Case Study of Norm
Management
Traditional legal policy regulating marriage reflected unbounded enthusiasm for the role of
the state as active norm manager. Although religion and morality played an important part in
shaping commitment and gender norms, a rigid legal framework coercively structured the
relationship, and powerfully amplified informal enforcement mechanisms with legal compulsion.
Thus, until relatively recently, family law and marital norms formed an internally coherent and
mutually reinforcing system for defining and enforcing parental and spousal obligations. The
traditional framework thus provides an excellent case study of the complex interactions between
law and norms.
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Consider also the 1872 opinion of Bradwell v. Illinois, in which the Supreme Court expressed strong support for
differentiated gender roles in upholding an Illinois law prohibiting women from being licensed to practice law. 83 U.S.
130. In his concurrence, Justice Bradley, opined that there is “a wide difference in the respective spheres and destines of
man and woman….Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy
which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.” Id. at 141 (Bradley, J.
concurring). Frances Olsen argues that the view of family and the market as separate spheres has hampered efforts at
reforms to equalize women’s place in society. Frances C. Olsen, The Family and The Market: A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform, 96 Harv, L. Rev. 1497 (1983).
67

.McAdams, supra note 14 at _.
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Parental commitment norms found concrete expression in preemptive rules such as
vaccination requirements, school attendance laws and prohibition of child labor. In general,
however, legal intervention in intact families was reserved for gross violations under child abuse
regulation, or for situations in which a child’s behavior revealed that parental discipline was
inadequate. Gendered parental obligations were enforced primarily in divorce regulation. The
tender years presumption awarded custody to mothers who adequately fulfilled their primary
caretaking role. A legal presumption was warranted because most mothers complied. Divorced
fathers were obliged to support the children of the marriage financially. Care and support of
illegitimate children rested in the mother. Fathers had no legal obligation, signaling the stigma
attached to illegitimate status.
Spousal commitment norms, in turn, were amplified indirectly by symbolic legal
expression and directly by legal sanctions. Criminal prohibition of adultery, although seldom
enforced, endorsed the norm of sexual fidelity in marriage, as did the tort sanctioning third party
interference with marital relations.68 Fault grounds for divorce - - the prohibition of adultery,
desertion and physical cruelty - - censured violators of marital commitment norms. Through these
prohibitions, the law reinforced the core obligations of marriage, signaling to the community that
violations were so reprehensible that the injured spouse was relieved of her duty to perform
marital obligations. The legal enforcement of marital obligations upon divorce also strengthened
commitment norms directly, by adding a serious sanction for violation. Divorce, with its often
humiliating public reckoning, substantial financial costs and formal change in status, became a
threshold across which many spouses would hesitate to cross.
Beyond the content of fault grounds for divorce, the fact that divorce law created a
substantial barrier to exit underscored that marriage was a lifelong commitment, reinforcing the
norm of marital loyalty. This barrier also generated feedback effects, which reinforced cooperative
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See Richard Fox, Trials of Intimacy (1999) (describing the scandal surrounding the alienation of affections suit
brought by Theodore Tilton against the prominent preacher Henry Ward Beecher in the late 19th century. Tilton alleged
that Beecher seduced his wife Elizabeth, a parishioner. After a highly publicized 5 month trial, the jury concluded by a
9-3 vote that Tilton had failed to provide sufficient evidence of the tort.) See also Ellman, Kurtz, and Scott, Family Law:
Cases, Texts and Problems _(1998).
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patterns of behavior that emerged as relational norms.69 Opportunistic behavior was deterred
because each spouse realized that exit was not an (easily) available option, and that retaliation
from the spouse could be expected for defection.
The state’s endorsement of marriage as a formally licensed, privileged status reinforced
the social norms regulating marriage in ways that may well be unique to this complex legal
institution.70 The legal privileges associated with marriage, together with the harsh sanctions
imposed on other intimate relationships,71 announced that marriage was a highly esteemed status.
For example, married couples enjoyed inheritance rights, unique rights of co-ownership, tax
benefits, a testimonial privilege protecting communications, and legitimacy status for their
children.72 Because marriage offered substantial tangible and intangible legal benefits, the
anticipated loss of these benefits on divorce was significant.73 Thus, traditional law created a
powerful combination of carrots and sticks such that fulfillment of marital obligations promised
rewards and defection resulted in serious sanctions.
More generally, the sharp legal boundaries of traditional marriage--its well-understood
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Game theory suggests that in a long term relationship, the anticipation of indefinite future interactions deters
opportunistic behavior. See note _ Supra In marriage, this notion might be expressed as follows: “We’re in this
relationship for the duration, and we may as well make the best of it.” See E. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking
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Traditional marriage was a privileged status, which carried, as Eric Posner puts it, a “basket of immutable
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obligations, privileges, and restrictions on entry and exit--reinforced its clear social meaning.74
This signaling function served several purposes which, in combination, tended to stabilize
marriage and to reinforce commitment norms. First, it facilitated a matching process, allowing
those with similar intentions to accurately identify themselves and each other as good prospects
for successful marriage. Marital status was also a clear signal to the community that the parties
were unavailable for other intimate relationships, and thus should not be pursued.75 The marital
status indicated the parties’ stability, reliability, and adherence to conventional values. Indirectly,
this reputational benefit tended to encourage married persons (at least publicly) to conform to the
behavioral expectations associated with the role, so as to reap the benefits of an esteemed status.
Finally, because the package of legally mandated behavioral restrictions was well understood,
the clear social meaning of marriage facilitated community enforcement.
A caveat is in order here. The powerful legal privileging of traditional marriage together
with the stigma attached to other intimate relationships undoubtedly constrained choices and led
some individuals to marry whose private preferences might have been for another arrangement.
This coercive influence likely tended to undermine the effectiveness of the matching function
somewhat and to distort the accuracy of the signal. Some of these individuals may have been
more likely to violate marital norms - - although as married persons, they would be subject to the
powerful enforcement mechanisms (except for guilt, perhaps) that encouraged compliance.76 For
others, the normative and legal constraints defining the social meaning of marriage undermined
their capacity to pursue self-defined life goals. Given the tendency to internalize potent social
values and norms, the extent of reluctant compliance under the traditional regime is unclear.
Nonetheless, these effects must be counted as inefficiencies of the legal and normative framework
of traditional marriage.
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The legal reinforcement of spousal commitment norms was accompanied by an equally
powerful validation of hierarchical gender roles and differentiated legal enforcement of
commitment obligations. Indeed, it is fair to say the social roles of women were more flexible and
less starkly hierarchical than the account expressed by legal regulation. Martha Minow has
argued that 19th century women exercised authority within their families and political influence in
society, despite the fact that they were effectively denied legal personhood.77 Legal reification of
sharply differentiated gender roles which subordinated the interests of women persisted well past
the mid-20th century. The marital rape exemption in criminal law, the differential enforcement of
the criminal adultery prohibition, the division of property upon divorce on the basis of title, the
rules of marital domicile, and the tender years presumption in custody law - - all told a sharply
gendered story of marriage.78
Traditional marriage law promoted the bundling of gender and commitment norms. The
costs of divorce regulation fell disproportionately on wives, who had far more to lose than did
husbands if the marriage failed. The wife against whom a fault ground was proved was not
entitled to alimony and was likely to lose custody of her children as well.79 For her, an
extramarital affair carried a disproportionate risk of onerous legal and social penalties.80 She
could become impoverished and be publicly labeled a bad wife and mother. There is little evidence
that unfaithful husbands were the object of similarly harsh sanctions. Moreover, even if the wife
was the “innocent and injured” party, she was likely to receive minimal spousal support. Thus, the
legal regime reinforced the gendered and disparate application of spousal commitment norms to
husbands and wives.81
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Summary
By all appearances, traditional marriage was regulated by an extraordinarily stable legal
and normative structure, consisting of a highly integrated set of norms embedded in a multilayered enforcement structure. Gender and commitment norms defining the marital relationship
were endorsed by spouses, and consistently reinforced by the larger community . These norms
were highly interconnected within a rigid legal framework which functioned to define and enforce
community expectations. The result was a regulatory scheme that was quite effective in
encouraging spouses to perform their obligations faithfully - -although, as I have suggested, it was
more effective with wives than with husbands.

III. A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN MARRIAGE
The subsequent history of the evolution of legal and normative marriage has revealed that
the apparent stability of traditional marriage was illusory. Beginning in the 1960's, powerful
social forces challenged traditional spousal norms as inconsistent with modern values, and law
makers sought to respond by restructuring the legal framework to reflect modern notions of
bounded commitment and gender equality. The overall impact has been a more passive legal role
in reinforcing marital commitment together with systematic efforts to express an egalitarian vision
of marriage. Meanwhile, parental commitment norms and the supporting legal framework have
remained remarkably stable, despite changes in family structure.
A. Social Change and the Evolution of Marital Norms
The broad outlines of the story of sweeping changes in marriage and family roles in the
past generation are familiar. With the technological revolution, women, able to control fertility
and less burdened by domestic tasks, moved into the workplace in large numbers. Sharply
differentiated marital roles have become somewhat blurred, and at least a theoretical commitment
to gender equality has dominated political and social discourse (although in practice, women have
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continued to bear primary domestic responsibilities).82 Marriage has become a more unstable
relationship. Although lasting marriage continues to be a cherished goal for most people, many
have become pessimistic of its achievement in the face of increases in divorce rates.83 Further,
marriage no longer retains its privileged status as the only acceptable intimate relationship. For
many couples, cohabitation precedes or substitutes for marriage. Meanwhile, single parent
households have become common, mostly headed by unmarried or divorced women.
In general, these social changes are reflected in the dilution of the gender and commitment
norms that defined spousal roles in traditional marriage. In the 1960's and 70's, feminists
deployed the egalitarian values manifested in the civil rights movement to challenge hierarchical
marital roles as well as the associated discrimination against women in the public sphere.
Although fundamental gender role change remains an unrealized ideal, norms censuring gender
hierarchy have emerged in much of society, and the rhetoric of marriage as a partnership
dominates public discourse.84 Marital commitment norms have changed as well. For most people,
the vow of commitment “until death do us part,” is conditional not only on the spouse’s
compliance with behavioral norms, but also on an acceptable level of personal fulfillment. The
erosion of commitment norms may be due, in part, to their historic association with norms
supporting gender hierarchy. As spousal gender norms have become increasingly disfavored,
commitment norms, intimately bundled with the discredited norms, have also declined. Finally, the
privileged status of normative marriage has declined. Liberal tolerance and respect for autonomy
are reflected in deference to individual self-realization, and acceptance of diverse choices in
intimate relationships.85
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The picture is more complex than this account suggests, of course, and I hasten to qualify
it in several ways. First, the liberal account of marriage and intimate relationships does not enjoy
the same public consensus that once characterized traditional marriage. An outspoken religious
and cultural subgroup actively seeks public support for re-institution of traditional roles and
norms. More generally, although rigidly divided gender roles are less typical today, parental
obligations continue to be assigned on the basis of gender. This allocation reinforces women’s
dependency and, in subtle ways, perpetuates hierarchy in marriage.86 Attitudes about commitment
are also complex. Lifelong marriage continues to be an aspiration for many people, and divorce is
often experienced as a costly personal failure.87 Further, bad behavior in marriage (particularly
adultery) continues to generate criticism in most social contexts, although it may no longer lead to
social ostracism. Indeed, some behavioral norms, such as the prohibition of physical violence, are
stronger today than previously. Moreover, couples with successful and enduring marriages enjoy
social approval, and those who experience repeated failure risk at least mild censure.
Finally, parental commitment norms have not become weaker. Parents today continue to
be held responsible for the care and support of their children, and, indeed, there is some evidence
that this obligation may be expanding. Casual empiricism suggests that modern parents feel
obliged to be more involved in their children’s education and social lives than was true a
generation ago, and are more concerned about promoting their children’s healthy psychological
development.88 Moreover, the public discourse surrounding the recent increase in youth violence
suggests that parents are held morally responsible for the harms caused by their children.89
Another development which indicates that the scope of parental responsibility may be expanding
is the change in attitudes about the parental duties of unmarried fathers. Formerly absolved of
responsibility for (or even acknowledgment of) their children, unmarried fathers today are
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assumed to be bound by their parental role to provide support.90 In general, the obligation of
parents to promote their children’s welfare is at least as powerful today as it was historically.91
B. Legal Reform of the Marriage Relationship
In the relatively brief historical period since the 1960's, the legal framework that shaped
traditional marriage has also undergone revolutionary change. First, legal support for hierarchical
and differentiated gender roles in marriage has been systematically dismantled. Legal
discrimination against women in employment, education and other public contexts, which
reinforced the disparity in marriage, has also been prohibited. During this same period, no-fault
divorce reforms removed most restrictions on divorce. Finally, the sharp contrast between
marriage and other intimate relationships has blurred considerably, as legal protection has been
extended to cohabitation arrangements. In short, although the legal landscape of marriage would
not be unrecognizable to an observer from mid-century, the scenery would be very different.
Much of the revolution in gender regulation can be understood as an extension from race
to gender of the principles of the civil rights movement and its egalitarian legal reform. Sex
discrimination in employment and education became the target of state and federal legislation and
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has been the subject of successful constitutional challenges as well.92 In combination, these legal
reforms invited women to move beyond the constraints of gendered family roles, and facilitated
women’s efforts to succeed in the public sphere.
In the regulation of marriage itself, legal reform took the form either of abolishing
privileges, entitlements or restrictions that differentially affected husbands and wives, or of
extending them to both spouses. Thus, the marital rape exemption has been abolished in most
states, while eligibility for spousal support was extended to husbands who met the functional
requirements.93 Both parents are now liable for child support, and both have authority to
determine marital domicile. Neither is privileged to physically “discipline” the other. Sometimes - as in the case of abolition of the marital rape exemption and extension of alimony to husbands- the determination to apply egalitarian principles to marriage seems mostly to serve a symbolic
function.94 Other reforms--such as the enactment of equitable distribution statutes with their
potentially broad redistributive effects-- have had important practical consequences. Not all the
reforms benefited women. Replacing the tender years presumption with the best interest standard
created uncertainty about mothers’ custody claims, and has been regretted by many feminists.95
The consistent theme of these reforms has been a commitment by the state to formal gender
equality in marriage. Sometimes these legal developments seem to follow changes in social norms.
The abolition the marital rape exemption is of this type. Sometimes, as in the statutory reform
favoring joint custody, they represent an aspirational norm or simply a symbolic egalitarian
statement.96
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The no-fault divorce reforms have altered dramatically the termination of marriage in ways
that may have influenced marital behavior and weakened spousal commitment norms.
Surprisingly, the reformers who initiated this sweeping change had rather modest objectives.
There was no public clamor for reform of divorce law; indeed contemporaneous surveys revealed
public concern about increasing rates of divorce.97 The academics, practitioners and judges who
initiated divorce reforms believed that the removal of fault grounds would reduce the adversarial
character of divorce proceedings, and also protect their integrity, which was threatened by
collusion of couples who agreed that their marriage had failed.98 The objective of the Governors’
Commission in California in the 1960's, which proposed a no-fault statute that became a model for
later reforms, was to modernize the process of terminating marriage, while promoting
reconciliation through counseling.99 The reform laws initially permitted divorce on the basis of a
long separation or irretrievable breakdown as determined by the court or mutually recognized by
the spouses.100
The early no-fault reformers did not promote the revisions of divorce laws as social
reform. And certainly they did not argue for the redefinition of marriage as a relationship of casual
commitment. No-fault bills were treated as routine legislative business; for the most part, they
were processed without public hearings or press coverage.101 Implicit in the reforms, however,
was the recognition of change in marital commitment norms and of the state’s more circumscribed
regulatory role. In abandoning fault, the reformers acknowledged that the causes of marital
failure are complex and difficult for an outsider to evaluate. Moreover, marital breakdown was
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understood to be often a matter of shared responsibility, and thus assigning fault to one spouse
was a simplistic distortion. The reforms also acknowledged implicitly that modern marriage had
become a more limited commitment, and that divorce should be allowed, not only on the basis of
the other party’s offense, but also on grounds of relational failure. Moreover, the determination of
marital failure did not need to be mutual. Early in the no-fault era, courts routinely began to allow
divorce on the basis of one party’s desire to be released from a marriage.
4\17The upshot of the reforms was the abolition of any legal enforcement of the marital
commitment, and a transfer of the authority to regulate the relationship from the state to the
individual spouses. In a relatively short period of time, state coercion of marital commitment was
replaced by neutrality and by the parties’ freedom to terminate marriage at will. In most states, the
legal norm has become quick, easy, unilateral divorce, reinforced by property division and spousal
support policies facilitating “efficient” termination of marital obligations.102 It appears that,
having rejected the legitimacy of state coercion under traditional law, law makers determined that
any legal enforcement of the marriage contract was illegitimate. Thus, ironically, under the
modern regime, voluntary contractual agreements undertaken to reinforce marital commitment are
unlikely to be legally enforced.103 Only recently, with the introduction of covenant marriage laws,
have couples been offered the option of legally binding commitments.
Another development that has influenced the social meaning of marriage is the legal
recognition of non-marital cohabitation relationships. In many states, courts routinely enforce
contractual agreements of cohabiting parties regarding property division and support upon
termination of the relationship. Once the morality of cohabitation no longer represented an
obstacle, the primary problem for legal enforcement was determining the existence and terms of
the contract. A few jurisdictions have gone further, suggesting that legal obligations between
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cohabiting parties may arise simply on the basis of the relationship or on equitable grounds.104
The legal status of cohabitation relationships has been further recognized under domestic
partnership laws that extend benefits traditionally reserved for marriage to both homosexual and
heterosexual cohabiting couples.
In sum, the legal regulation of marriage has undergone transformative change in the past
generation. The reforms progressed in different doctrinal contexts without coordination, but at
least two related themes emerge. First, the state has shifted from a highly coercive stance to a
rather passive one in which individuals are far freer to arrange their intimate relationships without
legal intervention. Following the no-fault reforms, lawmakers have declined to dictate
commitment terms in marriage, and have endorsed a private ordering regime, but at the same time
have declined to enforce even voluntary marital commitment.105 Second, the state has embraced
principles of equality, both between spouses, and between persons in families formalized by
marriage and those in other relationships. Modern legal regulation has been less passive in
regulating gender roles, systematically promoting equality between spouses and discouraging
differentiation and hierarchy. Distaste for inequality (together with deference toward individual
choice) has stimulated the removal of legal stigma from non-marital family relationships. Some of
these reforms, such as the prohibition of gender distinctions, were the product of a broad and
coherent policy agenda, the goals of which have been only modestly fulfilled. Others, like no-fault
divorce law, were narrower in their purpose, but have produced substantial, largely unintended,
effects. Through a piecemeal process, the reforms have created modern legal marriage, a very
different relationship from its traditional version, but one in which, I will argue in the next Part,
gender and commitment continue to be linked in subtle but important ways.
In striking contrast to the state’s laissez faire attitude toward marriage, legal enforcement
of parental obligations has expanded both in scope and strength in recent years. Legal reforms
imposing responsibility on parents for the misconduct of their children effectively hold parents
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liable for failure to perform child rearing tasks adequately.106 Of broader importance are the
changes in legal policy toward children born to unmarried women. These children now are
entitled to the same rights to care, support and parental property as children whose parents are
married.107 The primary effect of this change is to impose financial support obligations on all
fathers, regardless of marital status, obligations that are defined and enforced through a complex
network of federal and state child support regulations. The legal reforms also have strengthened
the obligations of non-custodial divorced parents. Contrary to the predictions of some observers
in the 1980's, the general attenuation of family commitment in the no-fault divorce era has not
diminished responsibility for child support.108 Indeed, there is evidence of a perceived need to
reconcile the freedom of parents to divorce with their ongoing parental obligations. Thus, the
move to no-fault unilateral divorce has been justified on the ground that an unhappy marriage
harms the psychological development of children.109

IV. LEGAL REFORM AND THE CHANGING SOCIAL MEANING OF MARRIAGE
It is uncontroversial that the social norms regulating marriage have changed, and it seems
clear that the legal reform of traditional marriage has played a role in these changes. However,
claims about the extent of the law’s influence and the precise mechanisms that have effected
change are necessarily speculative. Moreover, the impact of family law on social norms seems to
vary in different contexts in ways that are rather puzzling. Sometimes, formal legal expression of
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the desired behavior seems to have promoted and reinforced normative change in a relatively
straightforward way.110 Sometimes, however, the state’s efforts seem to have little impact, and
sometimes those efforts produce unintended effects.
Analysis of the interaction between legal reform and the evolution of spousal and parental
norms over the past generation suggests some underlying patterns. The state has functioned rather
well as a norm manager in reinforcing parental commitment norms. On the other hand, legal
change has had more limited effects on gender norms. Legal support of equality in marriage has
reinforced an egalitarian trend, but both men and women have been reluctant to share parental
responsibility. Finally, the law’s influence on spousal commitment norms has been powerful, but
in my view, largely inadvertent. No-fault divorce laws, together with the de-privileging of
marriage, have undermined norms of marital commitment.
My argument is that variation in the impact of legal change on marital norms has much to
do with the residual effects of norm bundling, the intertwining of gender and commitment norms
in traditional marriage. The taxonomy of marital norms reveals that, as gender and commitment
norms functioned within a formal regulatory framework, they gradually became intertwined.
When norm bundling occurs, dis-aggregation can be difficult. I suggested earlier, for example,
that the discrediting of gender hierarchy weakened spousal commitment norms. This phenomenon
also can impede legal efforts to influence the evolution of a marital norm, through reforms that
seek either to promote change in a disfavored norm or to reinforce a favored norm. Historically,
commitment norms and gender norms were bundled within a legal regulatory framework that
cohesively defined traditional marital roles. Modern legal reformers seeking to shape marital
norms - - such as the proponents of covenant marriage - - must contend with the confounding
effects of this historic association.
Clarifying the role of norm bundling provides a purchase for better understanding and
explaining the impact of legal change on the social norms regulating marriage. But, predicting the
impact of legal initiatives remains a very uncertain business. Contemporary marital and family
110
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norms are evolving in a polarized social context, one in which private preferences may be
disguised. Preference disguise makes prospective evaluation of the likely impact of legal initiatives
a speculative endeavor and inhibits the development of a predictive theory.
A. Comparing the Effects of Legal Change on Parental Commitment Norms and Gender
Norms
The law has played its most effective role in both extending and reinforcing norms of
parental obligation over the past generation. Children consistently have been the object of benign
paternalistic intentions, and a broad societal consensus supports imposing responsibility on all
parents for the care and development of their children.111 Defections by parents generally are
criticized harshly. Thus, in the 1970's and 1980's, when norm entrepreneurs publicized data
showing that many divorced fathers failed to pay child support, defaulters were stigmatized as
“deadbeat dads.”112 The extension of this obligation to children of unmarried parents occurred
relatively seamlessly, bolstered by egalitarian values and sympathy for these children as the
innocent products of parental choices.
Analyzing the impact of these child support statutes on parental norms offers some insight
into the mechanisms by which law can effectively influence social norms. First, there appears to
have been compatibility between the law’s behavioral directives and a general societal consensus
about parents’ financial obligation to support their children. As easy divorce became more
common and marital obligations more attenuated in the 1970's and 1980's, there was initially some
uncertainty about the parameters of parental responsibility and the precise boundaries of
acceptable behavior of non-custodial divorced parents. Early in the no-fault period, legal
enforcement of child support obligations was lax. Child support legislation expressed a societal
consensus that non-custodial parents continue to bear responsibility for their children and that the
weakening of spousal commitment norms did not extend to children. Beginning in the mid-
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1980's, the federally mandated guidelines provided concrete rules to quantify the obligation, and
the vast interstate and federal enforcement system powerfully reinforced informal mechanisms.113
Informal enforcement alone is predictably inadequate in this context, because defecting parents
can often escape sanctions from spouses and the community. Without legal enforcement, the
norm would erode as defections went unpunished. However, as I have suggested, some of the
legal strategies to enhance parental responsibility seem to have been tailored to stimulate norm
internalization and to employ informal community enforcement as a supplement to formal
sanctions.114
Furthermore, in the context of child support legislation, the compatibility of the legal
reform with the underlying parental commitment norm was not undermined by its association with
disfavored gender norms. Although gender norms in marriage prescribed fathers’ obligation of
financial support, the legal enforcement of that obligation does not invoke association with
disfavored aspects of gender norms. First, child support legislation comprehensively targeted all
non-custodial parents, diffusing any linkage with gender norms in traditional marriage. More
important, enforcement of this parental obligation in no way reinforces women’s subordination or
traditional gender hierarchy. Instead, child support reduces mothers’ dependency and promotes
sharing of the burden of child rearing between parents living apart. Thus, the law’s effective norm
management can be attributed in part to the absence of the confounding effects of norm bundling
as well as to the stability of norms of parental obligation.115
Compare the impact on gender norms of legal reforms promoting egalitarian marriage.
Law makers have systematically withdrawn legal support from gender hierarchy in marriage, and
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modern law offers an ideal of marriage as an equal partnership of autonomous individuals.116 The
legal model of egalitarian marriage also implicitly discourages differentiated roles. For example,
replacing the tender years presumption with the best interest standard amounts to a deregulation
of the maternal child care obligation. Some legislatures go a step further, endorsing joint custody
and thus encouraging parents to share child care responsibility.117 More subtly, modern divorce
law discourages gender role differentiation by denying wives who pursue traditional roles
adequate insurance against the risk of divorce.118 These reforms together represent a challenge to
traditional gender norms in marriage. If the legal initiatives have been effective, then gender
equality in marriage should be well established and gender norms significantly weakened.
On one level, there has been remarkable progress toward egalitarian marriage. The
endorsement of gender equality dominates public discourse. Moreover, there is every reason to
believe that public support for equality in marriage is reflected in changed private attitudes, and
that distaste for patriarchy and subordination of wives is widespread. Casual empiricism suggests
that most people believe that husbands and wives are equal partners in marriage. Nevertheless,
role differentiation continues to be evident in the division of marital obligations, most importantly
in the assignment of responsibility for children. In most families, both mothers and fathers accept
the norm that mothers bear primary responsibility for children.119 Even where women have
demanding jobs, they tend to function as the managers of their children’s lives, a role most women
do not wish to relinquish.120 This leads, in turn, to career choices that accommodate parenting

116

Legal prohibitions and sanctions have also directly targeted some behavior by husbands--such as physical assault- that was tolerated in traditional marriage. The abolition of the marital rape exemption stands as a powerful statement
endorsing the status of wives as autonomous agents. People v. Liberta. In practice, rape charges are almost never
brought against husbands unless the couple is separated or the wife injured in the sexual assault.
117

See K. Bartlett & C. Stack, Joint Custody.
118

Further, child support and alimony are awarded on a gender neutral basis.

119

Check cites in Pluralism Cynthia Epstein, Michael Lamb; Hochschild

120

See studies cited in Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preferences.

43

duties, reinforcing gender difference and women’s dependency.121 Gendered parenting norms
continue to be internalized by mothers, self- enforced through guilt, and reinforced by community
expectations about parental behavior. The continued robustness of these norms remains the
primary impediment to fully developed norms of egalitarian marriage.
The resistance to egalitarian parenting norms can be seen as a function of two factors.
First, gender norms that encourage mothers to be primary caretakers are not inherently linked to
hierarchy, although they contribute to women’s dependency, and ultimately reinforce power
imbalance in marriage. In this context, role differentiation is not equated to subordination. Some
feminists exalt the maternal role as central to women’s identity, and for many women, child
rearing is very rewarding.122 Second, resistance to norm change can be understood as a function
of norm bundling.
In traditional marriage, parental commitment norms were deeply intertwined with gender
norms. For women, being a good parent meant being a good mother, which meant being primarily
responsible for children. Because these norms were traditionally bundled, and because norms of
parental obligation have continued to be robust during the recent period of social change, mothers
may be less responsive to legal reforms that express support for a new norm of shared parenting.
Because women have long internalized the primary obligation of child care, gender norms
regulating parenting may be more entrenched and resistant to change than those that shape the
spousal relationship. The upshot is that, in this context, norm bundling undermines legal efforts to
promote change in parenting norms that have become inefficient, because of their long association
with other norms that continues to be strongly endorsed.
B. The Effects of Legal Change on Spousal Commitment Norms
1. Deregulation and Marital Commitment
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Divorce law reforms of the past generation grew out of the perception that the legal
structure, while supporting spousal commitment norms, was out of step with other broader
values. The notion of a coercive state dictating the terms of marriage was inconsistent with
contemporary norms of privacy and autonomy. However, no-fault divorce law did far more than
adjust legal regulation to express modern values of marital commitment. It undermined and
weakened these norms in ways that have contributed to marital instability. The reforms were not
intended to express a dramatically revised vision of marriage as a casual commitment, and most
people do not view the relationship in that way. Nonetheless, this is the account of marriage
offered by the modern legal regime, which facilitates easy termination of the relationship while at
the same time discouraging contractual commitment. This seems likely to affect the way people
think about marriage and the way they act.
One effect of the legal deregulation of marriage has been to leave the boundaries of marital
commitment undefined. Outmoded fault grounds were once the concrete rules that prescribed
both behavioral expectations and also the conditions for excuse from the obligations of marital
commitment. These have been abolished, but no rules have been substituted to provide direction
(to spouses and to other enforcers) about modern norms of commitment. The upshot of this
deregulation is that the broad normative commitment standard embraced by most individuals
entering marriage is no longer particularized by guidelines describing specific behavioral
expectations. Thus, for example, if relational failure justifies divorce, what effort is expected to be
sure that the relationship has truly failed? To what extent and in what ways are the parties obliged
to act so as to avoid marital failure? The absence of guidelines leaves each spouse to interpret
whether his or her behavior conforms to the now vaguely defined commitment expectations.
Predictably, the spouse who is tempted to defect may be inclined to interpret the requirements to
suit her immediate interest.123 The vagueness of the standard also undermines community
enforcement, since deciding whether any misbehavior or defection constitutes a norm violation
becomes less certain.
Deregulation has also removed legal enforcement as a mechanism that strengthens spousal
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commitment norms. Under the no fault regime, substantial legal barriers to divorce have been
removed and the cost of exit from marriage has been lowered significantly.124 One effect of this
legal change is that the precommitment function of legal enforcement is lost to those spouses
whose long-term interest lies with marital stability and cooperation. With deregulation of
commitment, the couple must rely exclusively on informal mechanisms to maintain (or restore) a
cooperative equilibrium. The dynamics of spousal interaction can be intense, and conflict can
escalate into a retaliatory pattern which may be harder to reverse if exit is always an option. The
threat of instability is further exacerbated because each party knows the other is also free to leave.
In contrast, the realization that the traditional marriage relationship could not easily be
abandoned may have encouraged both parties to avoid behaviors that could lead them to confront
the costly decision to divorce.125
If this analysis is correct, the deregulation of commitment under no-fault law does more
than serve the legitimate purpose of releasing unhappy spouses from marriages that can not be
saved. It may also destabilize relationships in which legal reinforcement of informal norms could
assist spouses in achieving their goal of marital fulfillment. The absence of clearly defined
commitment expectations and the availability of easy exit weaken the norms that encourage
spouses to renew their efforts when stresses and temptations threaten the relationship. This may
result in marital failure for some couples whose marriages might have weathered hard times if
legal reinforcement of commitment norms were available to deter defection. Thus, in an effort to
correct an outmoded expression of commitment, the legal reforms inadvertently destroyed a
useful mechanism that encouraged mutually beneficial cooperation for many parties.
On a societal level, no-fault divorce law weakens commitment norms by making divorce
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easier and therefore more common. Following the withdrawal of legal enforcement, the relative
(as well as the absolute) number of persons divorcing increased.126 It can fairly be assumed that
this number included both those who formerly would have been imprisoned in failed marriages
and those for whom the withdrawal of legal enforcement undermined marital stability. In theory at
least, as the number of divorces increases, secondary norms that promote community enforcement
should weaken, and enforcement should become even less effective.127 This should further weaken
commitment norms, which, in turn, contributes to greater marital instability, leading to more
divorce. Through such a spiraling process, commitment norms may unravel altogether. To the
extent that this process is merely a function of changing attitudes about marital commitment, the
legal initiatives themselves may have had little independent impact. But if divorce law distorts
widely held notions about marital commitment, it has arguably contributed to the weakening of
spousal commitment norms and the instability of marriage.
2. Deregulation and the Signaling Effect of Marriage
Choosing marriage once signaled an election to undertake a serious commitment to a lifelong relationship governed by clear behavioral expectations. The signal carried by the marriage
decision today is far more ambiguous. Because choosing marriage no longer carries significant
commitment costs, both those who desire serious commitment and those who seek a more casual
relationship might reasonably select marriage.128 Moreover, premarital agreements allow couples
considerable latitude to customize the marriage relationship so as to further reflect their individual
preferences and expectations. Finally, the differences between marriage and informal unions are
becoming less distinct. Individuals have considerable freedom to exit in both types of intimate
relationships. In both, the parties can tailor their legal relationship contractually to limit or extend
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relational obligations (other than making a binding commitment). In both marriage and informal
unions, couples may vary in their behavioral expectations of one another.
The impact of these many changes is to dilute the quality of the signal sent by a decision to
marry. Individuals searching for lifelong marriage partners have been deprived of one key means
of indicating the seriousness of their desire to make an enduring commitment to the
relationship.129 They also have lost a tool for evaluating whether prospective partners are
similarly interested in a lasting marriage. The pooling of individuals with different tastes for
commitment is likely to increase the incidence of inefficient matching in the marriage market. In
general, it may be uncertain whether modern individuals entering marriage mean to be subject to
the obligations and behavioral expectations that traditionally defined the relationship. Moreover,
the power of marital status as a signal to the community becomes weaker as the line between
marriage and informal cohabitation is blurred. Community monitoring and sanctioning of spousal
misbehavior become problematic if behavioral expectations vary across marriages and there are no
clear standards of marital obligation.130
It would be inaccurate to suggest that for most people marriage no longer functions as a
signal of serious intentions, or that marriage and informal unions are interchangeable in the extent
to which they are regulated by commitment norms. Individuals seeking enduring commitment in
an intimate relationship continue to choose marriage over cohabitation, and couples in informal
unions marry at the point where they are ready to undertake a greater commitment. Social
science data show clearly that cohabitation relationships are both less stable and less satisfying
than marriage.131 In part, this is due to self-selection, as those persons who believe that greater
personal fulfillment will come from a lasting relationship are willing to bear the (now reduced)
marginal costs of compliance with marital norms. What has changed as a result of the legal
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reforms is the power of the signal. Modern marital law offers individuals only a very modest
opportunity to undertake commitment, and thus choosing marriage no longer signals intentions or
triggers expectations as reliably as was once true.
C. Norm Management: Legal Reinforcement of Spousal Commitment Norms
1. The Theoretical Case for Norm Reform
A few lessons about norm management emerge from the recent reforms in family law.
First, the experience with no-fault reforms suggests that deregulation can be as important as
regulation in influencing the evolution of norms. Deregulation is most likely to have the effect of
undermining existing norms for which the abolished rules provided reinforcement. Another lesson
is that seemingly unrelated legal changes to a complex institution can have an amplified and often
unintended impact. The combined impact of privatization reforms in multiple family law contexts
plausibly has been to destabilize marriage, though none of the reforms had this purpose.
If family law reforms have inadvertently undermined spousal commitment norms, the
question becomes whether law makers can function effectively as norm managers to correct the
problem, providing couples with effective means to legally enforce marital commitment.
“Effectiveness” would be measured by the readiness of couples to utilize the legal mechanisms
and their actual impact on commitment norms. A further consideration is whether such legal
options can be structured so as not to undermine other important legal and normative objectives.
In theory, the option of legally enforceable commitment would seem to provide a useful
tool to individuals contemplating a long-term, intimate relationship. The evidence that marriages
are both more stable and more satisfying than cohabitation arrangements suggests that many
couples may benefit from the availability of a distinctive marriage option. By differentiating
marriage with legal commitment from other unions, such an option would embody a clearer signal
of commitment, thus facilitating better matching of individuals at the outset of the relationship.
Indeed, a modern commitment option, created in a context in which other intimate relationships
are socially acceptable alternatives, should function as a more accurate signal than did traditional
marriage.
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A marriage commitment option expands the available relationship choices and thus is
wholly compatible with modern values of personal autonomy. This point deserves elaboration,
because the deregulation of marital commitment that is embodied in easy exit policies is
commonly understood to be a necessary incident of the law’s deference to personal autonomy in
intimate relationships. To be sure, advocates for a return to moralistic legal restrictions on
intimate relationships are a distinct minority in the public debate. However, legal passivity is not
the only alternative to the coercive policies that are now discredited. State coercion and state
enforcement of voluntarily assumed legal obligations are quite different actions. As is well
understood in the realm of commercial contracts, legal enforcement expands rather than restricts
individual autonomy. To be sure, legal enforcement limits “ex post autonomy,”or the freedom of
individuals to renege on their promises.132 But what is lost under modern divorce law is “ex ante
autonomy” or the freedom to commit. Since the freedom to commit includes the freedom to
choose not to commit, ex ante autonomy is the more robust conception of personal freedom. The
law of contract is based on this premise.133
A commitment option may also generate social value beyond the benefit to parties
choosing legal marriage. The financial security, emotional support, and mutual care that marriage
partners provide each other over time potentially reduces the burden on society. In this sense,
society has a stake in the stability of marriage, one that becomes more substantial in marriages
with minor children. As spousal commitment norms become weaker, parents may end marriages
that are only moderately unhappy.134 However, empirical social science studies that examine the
impact of divorce on the adjustment and development of children consistently indicate that this
trend is worrisome. The research offers little support for the conventional justification of divorce
as a move that usually promotes the welfare of the affected children. For most children, divorce
has a harmful impact on their future social integration, educational and occupational attainment,
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and psychological well being. The unsettling headline is that unless the level of conflict between
parents is intense, children would be better off if their unhappy parents stayed married.135 This
research finding put unconstrained parental choices in a more negative light. At a minimum, the
data suggests that commitment mechanisms that promote marital stability in families with children
may have broader social utility.
2. Covenant Marriage as a Norm Management Initiative.
Covenant marriage statutes, such as the recent enactments in Louisiana and Arizona, offer
an option for reinforcing spousal commitment norms.136 Couples who choose covenant marriage
over marriage regulated by conventional no-fault divorce law agree to premarital counseling and
to divorce only upon the establishment of fault or after a significant period of separation. No other
basis for divorce is available. The most important features of covenant marriage are the
foreclosing of easy exit from marriage even by contemporaneous agreement, and the separation
period, which is usually two years. Although critics have targeted covenant marriage as a “the
return to fault,” Louisiana, at least, specifies fault grounds under its alternative no-fault statute.
Thus, statutory authority to bring divorce claims on fault grounds is not an innovation.
It is plausible that the legislative movement to promote covenant marriage statutes might
be seen as heralding the emergence of a new norm of marital commitment. By choosing covenant
marriage, prospective spouses can signal their serious intentions to each other and to the
community. The availability of covenant marriage may facilitate matching, because it provides
real options based on level of commitment, and encourages the couple to disclose information
about their aspirations to one another.137 The restrictions on divorce provide concrete rules
clarifying behavioral expectations for commitment. Although, as Robert Scott and I have argued,
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basing divorce on fault grounds is problematic,138 the mandatory separation period usefully
establishes the extent of spousal effort required before the relationship can be abandoned. This
obstacle to divorce functions as a precommitment mechanism directly by discouraging defection;
it also reinforces norms promoting cooperation in marriage. Widespread election of covenant
marriage could reduce the incidence of divorce, which in turn could independently strengthen
commitment norms.
a. Impediments to Norm Management: The Bundling Effect
Although covenant marriage appears promising as a legal mechanism to reinforce marital
commitment norms, it is unclear whether it will function effectively in the contemporary setting.
Moreover, the impediments to success suggest some formidable obstacles that confront legal
efforts at norm management in this context. First, legislatures considering covenant marriage face
a challenge setting terms of commitment that will function effectively as a signal without unduly
burdening contemporary values of equality and tolerance. Covenant marriage, like any signal,
purports to separate the reliable, committed types who choose this option from the more shallow
ones who do not. To be effective, the signal must be sufficiently costly to deter the shallow types.
If it is not, a pooling equilibrium is possible, in which everyone chooses covenant marriage, even
those who do not have serious intentions, in order to secure the reputational benefits from the
signal. Alternatively, if the signal is perceived as costly by the less committed types, and is
selected only by the most committed types, it risks stigmatizing those who do not choose
covenant marriage. This risk is inherent in any reform that elevates the status of marriage over
other unions or family groups. Thus, an inherent tension exists between privileging marriage as a
distinctive status, in order to induce a separating equilibrium, and promoting tolerance regardless
of family status.139
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The impact of a covenant marriage statute (or of any other norm management reform)
depends on the social meaning that the reform comes to assume. If covenant marriage is viewed
as inconsistent with modern values and more specifically as an effort to revive the disfavored
marital norms of earlier era, it likely will not be widely chosen and will have little impact. On the
other hand, it may be seen as usefully offering the person who want commitment in marriage the
means to find a partner who shares this goal and to reinforce their relationship. Although the
attitudes of many Americans toward marriage might suggest that the latter scenario is more likely,
the former is also possible. Public opinion, editorial commentary and media reaction to early
covenant marriage legislation have been mixed, suggesting that the response may be complicated
by contemporary social currents and influenced by deep historical associations.140 For many
people, aspirations for lasting marriage coexist with a deep distrust of legal enforcement of marital
commitment.
What explains the distaste for legally enforceable marital commitment, even in the
relatively innocuous form of the existing covenant marriage statutes? Many of the objections are
curious and don’t withstand close inspection.141 Legal enforcement of marital commitment is
apparently understood by critics as government coercion.142 Its choice-enhancing properties are
ignored, even where it is voluntarily chosen by the parties from a menu of options. Some
feminists have articulated strong opposition, seeing constraints on divorce as a threat to women’s
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freedom to escape unhappy marriages.143 Although critics argue that covenant marriage (and
restrictions on divorce generally) will trap women in abusive marriages, surely legal mechanisms
could be constructed to protect against this risk.144 Moreover, marriage breakdown usually
inflicts greater costs on women than on men.
This anxiety points to a deeper resistance to legal enforcement of spousal commitment.
Although, in theory, spousal commitment norms can be dis-aggregated from gender norms, a
strong association continues between the two sets of norms that structured the traditional
marriage relationship. Over a long period of time, within the unifying legal framework of
traditional marriage, commitment norms and gender norms became bundled, perhaps inextricably.
My hypothesis is that through the regime of coercive restrictions on marriage, law forged a bond
between these two sets of norms, which interacted in apparent harmony, powerfully reinforcing
each other to collectively shape marital behavior.145 Over the last generation, it is widely
understood that gender subordination was coercively imposed on women, most powerfully by the
traditional legal regime. Support for gender equality has come to dominate public discourse. In
this climate, legal enforcement of commitment (such as covenant marriage) threatens to resurrect
discredited spousal gender norms, and is viewed with deep distrust.146 Such policies, on this view,
are tainted by their long association with legal enforcement of gender hierarchy.147
The suspicion that legal enforcement of spousal commitment creates the threat of
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resurrecting gender hierarchy is not wholly groundless. Gender equality in marriage is far from
firmly established. Gender roles continue to be differentiated, and still tend to restrict the freedom
of wives more than that of husbands. Thus, the reintroduction of legally enforceable commitment
raises the specter of restrictions on women’s tenuous autonomy in marriage. More concretely, as
the expressed concerns about spousal abuse suggest, legal commitment threatens to bind some
women to relationships grounded in patriarchal domination. Although spousal commitment norms
are endorsed, the endorsement is often qualified by the preference for ex post autonomy. What
remains is a very thin conception of commitment.
Some feminists hold that marriage is so contaminated by its traditional patriarchal
gendered structure that it should be abolished, or at least given no special legal recognition. Thus,
Martha Fineman argues that the law should protect and privilege the mother-child dyad as the
core family group, and leave intimate adult relationships to the realm of contract. Many feminists,
however, recognize the value of marriage as a stable, potentially fulfilling relationship that can
serve the interests of women and children as well as men.148 For these scholars, the project is to
promote equality in marriage, either through egalitarian family roles or through legal protection of
women who undertake differentiated roles.149 Most of these scholars, as well as many feminists in
the public arena, would reject legally enforceable commitment as regressive, although many would
generally endorse the value of marital commitment, if untainted by gender.150
Concern about the lingering association between gender and commitment norms is not
alleviated by the debate about marriage and family policy in the political arena. In truth, many
modern religious and cultural conservatives would like to return to an earlier era of both stable
marriage and patriarchal gender roles. Some of these observers explicitly link family instability
and the lamented decline of “family values” to the abandonment by women of their domestic
roles.151 Social conservatives advocate coercive legal intervention in service of the moral agenda
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of revitalizing the traditional family, by opposing abortion152 and day care and reviving legal
restrictions on divorce. Many conservatives have embraced covenant marriage statutes, albeit a
little reluctantly, as a politically viable means of restricting divorce. In this context, the prospects
for dis-aggregation of spousal gender and commitment norms, and the neutral evaluation of legal
policies that offer the option of marital commitment seem very remote.
Recognizing the residual impact of norm bundling provides a basis for informed
speculation about the success or failure of family law reforms in shaping social norms--and it may
be useful in ex-post explanations. The experience with family law reform suggests norm bundling
can play a role both in legal efforts to strengthen an existing norm and in efforts to promote norm
change. Thus, legal efforts to reinforce a useful but threatened norm (spousal commitment
norms) may be undermined by its strong historic association with other norms that were once
powerful but are currently unpopular (norms enforcing gender hierarchy). Norm bundling may
also impede legal reform designed to promote normative change when a norm that is no longer
efficient has long been linked to one that remains robust. This may explain the slow pace toward
egalitarian parental roles, despite legal support for normative change. In contrast, some efforts at
norm management are not undermined by the residual effects of norm bundling. Recent
government efforts to reinforce parental commitment norms, for example, have not been impeded
by associations with unpopular or obsolete norms.
This insight suggests a strategy for legal reinforcement of marital commitment that might
be effective in avoiding negative bundling effects (and indeed in utilizing norm bundling to
promote positive associations). Legal reforms that explicitly link spousal commitment with
parental commitment might fare better than existing covenant marriage legislation.153 The
accumulating evidence about the harmful impact of divorce on children undermines a key
justification for parental freedom to leave unhappy marriages. If this information becomes well
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known, it may affect attitudes about divorce.154 Given the continued robustness of parental
commitment norms, it is plausible that new behavioral expectations for parents who are unhappy
in their marriage (and a new norm) may emerge. These changes could create greater receptivity
to legal initiatives that reinforce the emerging norm. For example, marriages involving minor
children could be subject to more extensive separation periods under covenant marriage statutes
(or covenant marriage could be limited to this group).
At most, these observations constitute a first tentative step in an explanatory theory of the
impact of law on the social norms regulating the complex institution of marriage. It is unclear
whether these observations can be generalized to other norm settings. Even in the marital context,
a careful examination of the effects of norm bundling does not permit confident predictions about
the likely impact of proposed legal initiatives on social norms. As I discuss in the next section, a
major obstacle to constructing a predictive theory is the difficulty in discerning ex ante the
intrinsic preferences of people who will be affected by the law.
3. Disguised Preferences and the Problem of Prediction in Norm Management
Predicting the impact of legal reforms is complicated by the phenomenon of disguised
preferences--gaps between expressed public opinion and private preferences.155 Preference
disguise is likely to occur to a certain extent in many norm contexts. The very existence of a norm
prescribing certain behavior will tend to generate both compliance and public expressions of
support, because of a desire to avoid the reputational costs associated with non-compliance. Thus,
the wife who hates child care and housework may conform to her prescribed role for fear of
criticism, not acknowledging publicly her distaste. Moreover, if she violates “good mother”
norms, community members may publicly sanction her to signal their endorsement of the norm,
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sometimes slowly through an evolutionary process. He explains the important role in this process of the tendency of
individuals to falsify preferences in response to social pressure.
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even if they privately are neutral about the behavior.156 The upshot is that social pressure to
conform to norms may obscure variations in private preferences, and distort the apparent strength
of the norm.
Preference disguise not only occurs when there is a dominant norm which many people
dislike. It also arises when public opinion is polarized on a sensitive topic and competition
develops over appropriate attitudes and behavior. In recent years, family roles and values have
become a battleground in a culture war, with social and religious conservatives battling liberals
and feminists to define family roles and norms.157 Each side attempts to dominate public discourse
and to impose costs on the expression of attitudes about family structure, roles, and behavior with
which they disagree. In this environment, candid expression of private preferences becomes more
costly, and preference disguise can be expected. It is generally assumed that most people have
more complex and less polarized views on gender roles, divorce, abortion, and other sensitive
family law topics than those reflected in public discourse.
Predictions about the success of any legal initiative that implicates these issues are highly
uncertain. Consider covenant marriage, for example. I have suggested that norm bundling appears
to influence responses to this reform. At this point, the extent of that influence is hard to assess
or predict, in part because private preferences are likely varied and hard to measure.158
Individuals considering marriage may perceive covenant marriage as a coercive political initiative
by those with a “family values” agenda. Alternatively, the legislation may be taken to legitimate a
norm that had seemed to be in decline, emboldening those who secretly regretted this trend. A
range of responses are plausible, and, ex ante, people may not be forthright about private
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When a social norm is established in a community, a secondary enforcement norm often arises. Community
members sanction violators to signal that they have the right values, and disapprove of the prohibited behavior.
Otherwise, they anticipate that they may be subject to criticism. See Kuran, McAdams, Sunstein
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In Louisiana, for example, there is some evidence that private opinion about covenant marriage is more
positive than the public debate would suggest. Nock survey
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preferences.159 A further complication is that, in this polarized political and social environment,
individual decisions may be affected by perceived costs or benefits of association with the public
supporters or opponents of legislation.160 For example, if covenant marriage is identified with
conservative Christian proponents, moderates who might otherwise choose this commitment
option may fear that its social meaning is “contaminated,” and that they will be sanctioned by the
social sub-group with which they identify.161 If public opinion moves in one direction or another,
that itself may influence preferences, and it will certainly influence willingness to express
preferences. The extent to which reputational concerns influence choices will vary, of course,
depending on the intensity of the private preferences and the extent of the perceived reputational
effect.
The key point is that, in assessing the likely impact of legal initiatives that implicate
“family values”, we are disabled from making confident predictions. We have no clear picture of
the pattern of private preferences that could affect decisions about covenant marriage, or the
extent to which these preferences are disguised in public discourse. Thus, predicting the decisions
that people will make, and more broadly the impact of the legislation, becomes an uncertain
business. Attitude surveys can provide some information,162 but surveys are not effective at
gauging intensity of preferences, or the point at which individuals would express a different
preference (or make a different decision) in response to shifts in public opinion which alter
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Some people may privately prefer traditional marital roles, and be emboldened by the statute to act on those
preferences. Others might take the enactment of the statute to express a modern egalitarian commitment norm, which is
compatible with their preferences. For others, legal commitment may generate anxiety or disdain, because of its
traditional associations or because of enthusiasm for personal freedom.
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Recall that no-fault divorce reform was enacted with little public discussion or controversy, perhaps making
the decisions of unhappy spouses less subject to concern about reputational effects. See t.a.n. _ to _ supra
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Cokie and Stephen Roberts describe how opinion about covenant marriage has become polarized because of the
support for the Louisiana law by religious conservatives. They suggest that liberals oppose the law, not on the merits,
but because of its supporters. Roberts and Roberts, Louisiana’s New Covenant Marriage Law Makes Good Sense, Salt
Lake Times, 8\31\97. In Oklahoma, a covenant marriage bill was supported many members of the state legislature,
because they feared reprisals from the Christian Coalition. Brian Ford, I Really Do, Tulsa World, 2\ 22\ 99.
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reputational costs.163 The framework developed in this essay may assist the project of (tentative)
explanation and interpretation of the influence of legal reforms on evolution of social norms in this
context. It does not provide the means to predict with any confidence what will be the
consequences of any given legal change.
D. Summary
An analysis of the dialectical relationship between recent family law reforms and evolving
social norms regulating marriage suggests that the following factors affect the impact of a legal
innovation on the evolution of any particular norm. First, the degree to which norms are bundled
may be important, specifically the degree to which a target norm is associated with a disfavored
norm. Second, the success of a legal reform may depend on the coincidence between the legal
prescription and community opinion. Legal initiatives that deviate substantially from an emerging
community consensus or that appears to support other disfavored norms are unlikely to have
substantial impact on the target norm. Lawmakers can misjudge community values and
preferences because they are subject to interest group pressure,164 or because public opinion
distorts private preferences. Under these conditions, the new rule will get little informal
community enforcement, and predictably will be subject to evasion or disapproval165
Despite these impediments, legal change can influence both the pace and direction of
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T. Kuran, Thus, if choosing covenant marriage were to become a widely endorsed signal of marital commitment,
those whose intrinsic preferences were mildly negative might either actually become more positive (as public opinion
influenced their intrinsic preferences) or choose covenant marriage despite continued reservations (because of concern
about reputational harm.) Those whose intrinsic preferences were intensely negative might continue to resist. Timur
Kuran discusses the complex relationship between intensity of intrinsic preference, changes in reputational costs, and
changes in expressed preferences.
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The response to legal reforms favoring joint physical custody is an illustration of a legal reform that failed to
influence behavior, because it was inconsistent with private preferences. These laws expressed support for equal
sharing of child care responsibility, but the predicted role change has not occurred. Joint custody advocates in the 1980's
(mostly fathers’ groups) lobbied for the passage of statutes favoring joint custody. Women’s groups opposed, arguing
that joint custody was a windfall for fathers, since in most families mothers were primary caretakers before divorce. E.
Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, supra note _. Robert Mnookin & Eleanor Maccoby’s study of parents with joint
custody showed that joint custodial arrangements tend to “drift” toward more traditional residential arrangements,
suggesting that, once the divorce proceedings were behind them, both mothers and fathers preferred arrangements in
which mothers have primary child care responsibility. Dividing the Child
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normative change. Individuals vary in the extent to which they are ready to tolerate reputational
costs by challenging existing norms. For each individual, this will depend on how much the norm
distorts private preferences, the level of anticipated sanctions for violation, and the value of acting
honestly on preferences.166 As I have suggested, norm entrepreneurs may advocate for new
norms, encouraging others to express and act on their intrinsic preferences. A legal rule
expressing the new norm may act as a catalyst, and may be embraced by those whose intrinsic
preferences it reflects. If many individuals were silenced by the old norm, rapid norm change may
occur. Prediction is highly uncertain, however, because the extent of private dissatisfaction with
the old norm and the readiness of individuals to risk censure for violation may be impossible to
measure ex ante (although information may emerge during the period of change).
Conclusion
This account of the relationship between family law and the social norms surrounding
marriage is a cautionary tale for norms scholars. Although the story suggests that legal reforms
can influence social norms, it does not offer much encouragement to those who are attracted to
the idea of norm management as a legal policy tool. This essay is a first step toward a
comprehensive understanding of the interaction between law and social norms in the regulation of
the most complex of human relationships - - marriage. Studying that relationship during a period
of dramatic change in both the legal and normative regulatory framework yields some insights
about the intricate interaction between these two regulators of human behavior. It also reveals
how much we have to learn about the about the mechanisms by which law influences norms in this
context.
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